SECURITIES REGULATION AND SMALL BUSINESS: RULE 504 AND THE CASE FOR AN UNCONDITIONAL EXEMPTION by Bradford, C. Steven
University of Nebraska - Lincoln 
DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln 
College of Law, Faculty Publications Law, College of 
2001 
SECURITIES REGULATION AND SMALL BUSINESS: RULE 504 AND 
THE CASE FOR AN UNCONDITIONAL EXEMPTION 
C. Steven Bradford 
University of Nebraska-Lincoln, sbradford1@unl.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/lawfacpub 
 Part of the Legal Studies Commons 
Bradford, C. Steven, "SECURITIES REGULATION AND SMALL BUSINESS: RULE 504 AND THE CASE FOR 
AN UNCONDITIONAL EXEMPTION" (2001). College of Law, Faculty Publications. 93. 
https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/lawfacpub/93 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law, College of at DigitalCommons@University of 
Nebraska - Lincoln. It has been accepted for inclusion in College of Law, Faculty Publications by an authorized 
administrator of DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln. 
ARTICLES
SECURITIES REGULATION AND SMALL BUSINESS:
RULE 504 AND THE CASE FOR AN
UNCONDITIONAL EXEMPTION
by
C. Steven Bradford*
Small businesses are an important part of the U.S. economy. VWhen small businesses
need to raise capital from the public, they must comply with securities laws and regula-
tions. Most operators of small businesses are unfamiliar with the intricacies of securities
law. As a result, they are likely to unwittingly violate these laws. This, combined with
the high relative cost to small businesses of registering securities, led the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) to create several exemptions, including Rule 504 of Regu-
lation D. Until recently, Rule 504 was a virtually unlimited exemption from the federal
registration requirement for offerings of under $1 million. But recent amendments have
made the Rule 504 exemption available to substantially fewer small businesses. This
Article explores the evolution of the small offering exemption, including those recent
amendments. It looks at the costs and benefits of securities regulation, and explains
why the SEC should return to an unconditional, or at least virtually unconditional,
small offering exemption.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Small businesses are an important part of the United States econ-
omy. In 1996, there were about 5.5 million small businesses in the United
States employing between zero and five hundred workers,' about 99% of
all non-farm U.S. businesses. 2 Businesses with five hundred or fewer
employees employ 53% of the private non-farm work force in the United
States, account for 47% of all sales, and are responsible for 51% of the
private gross domestic product.3 During the period 1992 to 1996, small
firms with fewer than five hundred employees also created virtually all of
the net new jobs in the U.S. 4
' U.S. Census Bureau, Statistical Abstract of the United States 557, tbl. 878
(1999), http://www.census.gov/prod/99pubs/99statab/sec17.pdf.
2 Office of Advocacy, Small Bus. Admin., The Facts About Small Business, 1997
(Sept. 1997), http://www.sbaonline.sba.gov/ADVO/stats/factl.html.
3 U.S. Census Bureau, supra note 1, at 557, tbl. 879.
4 Office of Advocacy, supra note 2. George Priest points out that these statistics,
which lump together all businesses with five hundred or fewer employees, may mask a
relative decline in the health of very small businesses-those with fewer than a
hundred employees. George Priest, Small Business, Economic Growth, and the
Huffman Conjecture 16 tbl.1 (Oct. 6, 2000) (unpublished manuscript, on file with
TheJournal of Small and Emerging Business Law). This is consistent with DeanJames
Huffman's hypothesis that regulation has seriously disadvantaged small business in
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These small businesses often find it difficult to raise capital. An obvi-
ous first source of capital is the entrepreneur's personal wealth, 5 but most
entrepreneurs have insufficient personal funds to finance a business.6
Loans are another possible source of financing, 7 but "because small start-
up businesses have little or no past record of performance, loans are vir-
tually impossible to obtain."8 Small businesses may also have great diffi-
culty obtaining money, particularly seed capital, from venture capital
funds.9 Many small business owners thus turn to friends and family,10
and, if they provide insufficient funds, to the general public.'I
When small businesses turn to public investors-often even when
they resort only to friends and family-those small businesses, whether
they realize it or not, encounter securities laws. The public sale of securi-
ties in the United States is heavily regulated. Under the Securities Act of
1933, issuers making public offerings must file a registration statement
with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and comply with
the Act's prospectus delivery requirements and restrictions on communi-
cations. In addition, the issuer may have to undergo a similar, sometimes
even more rigorous, registration process in the various states in which the
offering is made.
Federal and state regulation of securities offerings poses problems
for small businesses. Many small business issuers and their advisers are
totally unaware that they must comply with federal or state securities
law.12 Small business issuers often sell securities without consulting an
attorney. If they do consult an attorney, it is often an attorney unfamiliar
with federal securities law1 3 and "the many exemptions comprehensible
only to the lawyer familiar with the Alice-in-Wonderland quality of securi-
ties law."1 4 Small business promoters often mistakenly believe that federal
and state securities laws apply only to large corporations whose securities
America. See generally James L. Huffman, The Impact of Regulation on Small and Emerging
Businesses, 4 J. SMALL & EMERGING Bus. L. 307 (2000).
5 Arthur Levitt, Small Business Makes a Large Contribution, Remarks at the
Small Business Town Meeting in Richmond, Virginia (Apr. 21, 1997), www.sec.gov/
news/speeches/spchl 50.txt.
' The Impact of the 1992 Small Business Initiatives, 47 ADMIN. L. Riv. 511, 512
(1995) [hereinafter The Impact].
7 Levitt, supra note 5.
8 The Impact, supra note 6, at 512.
' Jill E. Fisch, Can Internet Offerings Bridge the Small Business Capital Barrier?, 2 J.
SMALL & EMERGING Bus. L. 57, 62 (1998).
10 Id. at 60; see also Levitt, supra note 5.
1 The Impact, supra note 6, at 512.
12 12AJosEPH C. LONG, BLUE SKY LAw 5-50 (2000).
i" Rutheford B. Campbell, Jr., The Plight of Small Issuers Under the Securities Act of
1933: Practical Foreclosure From the Capital Market, 1977 DUKE L.J. 1139, 1147; Therese
H. Maynard, The Uniform Limited Offering Exemption: How "Uniform" is "Uniform?"-An
Evaluation and Critique of the ULOE, 36 EMORY L.J. 357, 368-69 (1987).
'4 Mark A. Sargent, No More Tinkering! Let's Scrap the SEC's Rube Goldberg
Contraption for Small Business Offerings, Bus. L. Today, July-Aug. 1992, at 5.
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are listed on a national exchange. 15 Or, they may be vaguely aware of the
Securities Act exemption for "transactions by an issuer not involving any
public offering" 16 and think they are safe as long as they confine their
offering to friends and family. But the availability of the private offering
exemption turns on the investors' sophistication and access to informa-
tion about the business-in short, the ability of offerees to fend for them-
selves. 17 The private offering exemption is not available when promoters
sell to "a diverse group of uninformed friends, neighbors and associ-
ates," 18 or even to existing investors in the company.1 9 As a result, "[w]ith
monotonous frequency," securities lawyers are faced with small business
clients who have already sold securities with no concern for the applica-
tion of the Securities Act. 20
Even if they are aware of its requirements, the registration system is
costly-often too costly for small businesses. Registration is expensive and
the process can delay a company's stock offering for months. Moreover,
because of economies of scale in registration, the cost of registering small
offerings is disproportionately burdensome, consuming a greater per-
centage of the offering price than in larger offerings.2 1 The high cost of
Securities Act registration makes a registered public offering "impractical
for most small business issuers."2 2
Recognizing the undue burden the registration requirement
imposes on small businesses, the SEC has adopted several rules exempt-
ing smaller securities offerings from registration. Over the years, the SEC
has gradually expanded those exemptions and made them less restrictive.
Rule 504 of Regulation D, with a $1 million limit on the offering amount,
is the smallest of the small offering exemptions. In 1992, to facilitate the
access of small companies to the public capital markets, the SEC substan-
tially expanded Rule 504, making it a virtually unconditional exemption
from registration.
Rule 504 has been a popular small business exemption. In 1998,
almost 3000 Form D notices claiming the Rule 504 exemption were filed
15 Maynard, supra note 13, at 368-69.
16 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2) (1994).
17 SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 125 (1953).
" Non-Public Offering Exemption, Securities Act Release No. 4552, 1 Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. (CCH) 2770, at 2774 (Nov. 6, 1982). See also United States v. Hill, 298 F.
Supp. 1221, 1229 (D. Conn. 1969) (holding that an offering to forty-nine direct
purchasers, many of whom were the promoter's friends and acquaintances, did not
qualify for the private offering exemption).
1" See SEC v. Spence & Green Chem. Co., 612 F.2d 896, 902 (5th Cir. 1980)
(holding that an offering to hundreds of existing shareholders was a public offering).
20 Campbell, supra note 13, at 1147.
21 See infra Part V.A.
22 Jeffrey J. Hass, Small Issue Public Offerings Conducted Over the Internet: Are They
"Suitable"for the Retail Investor?, 72 S. CAL. L. REv. 67, 75 (1998).
[Vol. 5:1
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with the SEC,23 with approximately 1500 filings annually in prior years.2 4
In addition, Rule 504 probably protected many more small businesses
that were not even aware of the federal registration requirement and did
not file Form D notices.2 5
An unconditional exemption like the 1992 version of Rule 504
greatly simplifies securities regulation for small businesses. It reduces the
information costs to understand the system and minimizes the chance of
an inadvertent violation. 26 It also recognizes the disproportionate burden
the registration requirement imposes on small offerings.
In 1999, the SEC reversed course, imposing significant conditions on
Rule 504 offerings. It made Rule 504 offerings subject to Regulation D's
ban on general solicitation and advertising and restricted the resale of
securities acquired in a Rule 504 offering.27 As a result, there is no uncon-
ditional federal exemption from the Securities Act registration require-
ments, no matter how small the offering. Small business offerings
formerly exempted from the federal registration requirements are now
covered, significantly increasing the cost of raising capital and penalizing
unsophisticated small business issuers. SEC treatment of the smallest
securities offerings is now more restrictive than it has been since at least
1953.
This recent amendment of Rule 504 is an unfortunate step in the
wrong direction, not because it imposes costs on small businesses, but
because those costs far exceed any benefits to be gained. In its zeal to
protect investors, the SEC has ignored a basic economic tenet: regulation
is not justified if the cost of the regulation exceeds the benefits it pro-
duces. An unconditional exemption for small business offerings clearly
makes sense; Rule 504 should be restored to its pre-1999 state or another
unconditional exemption should be created in its place.
Part II of this Article outlines the requirements of Rule 504 before
and after the 1999 amendments. In Part III, I discuss the evolution of
Rule 504 and predecessor small offering exemptions. Part IV discusses
the significance of the 1999 amendments to Rule 504 and their probable
effect on small business issuers. In Part V, I explore the costs and benefits
23 Revision of Rule 504 of Regulation D, the "Seed Capital" Exemption,
Securities Act Release No. 7644, 64 Fed. Reg. 11,090, 11,094 (Mar. 8, 1999).
24 Revision of Rule 504 of Regulation D, the "Seed Capital" Exemption,
Securities Act Release No. 7541, 63 Fed. Reg. 29,168, 29,169 n.11 (proposed May 28,
1998).
25 The SEC does not collect data on how many of the companies using Rule 504
are small businesses, but it believes that most Rule 504 users are. Id. at 29,172.
26 Sargent, supra note 14, at 9 ("No regulatory regime will work, even if it is
purposefully deregulatory, carefully balanced and subtly expressed, if it is just too
hard to figure out. The transactional costs of understanding how the system works can
outweigh whatever benefits it is intended to produce, as the present [federal
securities law] system shows.").
27 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.502(d), .504(b)(1) (2000).
20011
6 TIE JOURNAL OF SMALL & EMERGING BUSINESS LAW
of Securities Act registration and explain why an unconditional small
offering exemption is justified.
II. THE CURRENT REQUIREMENTS OF RULE 504
Prior to the 1999 amendments, Rule 504 was a virtually uncondi-
tional exemption from the federal registration requirement for securities
offerings of $1 million or less. The 1992 version of Rule 504 had three
requirements: (1) a restriction on the companies eligible to use the
exemption, (2) a limit on the size of the offering, and (3) an essentially
toothless notice filing requirement. All of these requirements remain in
the current rule. In 1999, the SEC reinstated two additional requirements
that predated the 1992 liberalization of Rule 504: (1) a prohibition of
general advertising and general solicitation, and (2) restrictions on the
resale of securities acquired in Rule 504 offerings. However, the new rule
also contains exemptions from these new restrictions that are tied to state
securities laws. I will first discuss the requirements of Rule 504 as it
existed between 1992 and 1999, then turn to the new restrictions and
associated exemptions.
A. The Preexisting Requirements of Rule 504
1. Eligible Issuers
Rule 504 is not available to reporting companies, 2 8 investment com-
panies, 29 or so-called blank check companies, which are essentially start-
up businesses without specific business plans.30 The purpose of the first
two issuer restrictions is fairly obvious-to limit Rule 504 to small operat-
ing businesses. The refusal to allow blank check companies to use Rule
504 arises from the SEC's concern about the dangers of investing in such
companies. The SEC believes that blank check offerings are "a common
vehicle for fraud and manipulation,"3 1 and therefore chose to deny such
companies easy, unregulated access to the public capital markets.
2. Size of the Offering
Rule 504 is only available to offerings whose aggregate offering price
does not exceed $1 million. 32 Aggregate offering price is defined to
28 17 C.F.R. § 230.504(a) (1).
29 Id. at (a)(2).
30 In the words of the exemption, "A development stage company that either has
no specific business plan or purpose or has indicated that its business plan is to
engage in a merger or acquisition with an unidentified company or companies, or
other entity or person." Id. at (a) (3).
31 Removal of Rule 504a, Securities Act Release No. 6961, 57 Fed. Reg. 47,408,
47,408 (Oct. 16, 1992). See also Blank Check Offerings, Securities Act Release No.
6932, 57 Fed. Reg. 18,037 (Apr. 28, 1992) (adopting special rules for the registration
of penny stock offerings by blank check companies).
32 17 C.F.R. § 230.504(b) (2). To qualify for Rule 504, the entire offering must
not exceed the $1 million limit. 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(a). An issuer may not split a
[Vol. 5:1
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include all consideration received by the issuer for the securities, includ-
ing cash, services, property, notes, and cancellation of debt.3 3 Special
rules apply when some or all of the securities are sold for non-cash con-
sideration. If the issuer sells some of the securities for cash and some for
other consideration, the aggregate offering price is based on the cash
price.3 4 The total amount of the offering is calculated as if all of the
securities were sold for the cash price, eliminating the need to value the
non-cash consideration. If none of the securities in a Rule 504 offering
are sold for cash, the aggregate offering price is determined using "the
value of the consideration as established by bona fide sales of that consid-
eration made within a reasonable time."13 5 If there are no such bona fide
sales, the rule requires the use of the consideration's "fair value as deter-
mined by an accepted standard."36 The rule further provides that the val-
uation of any non-cash consideration "must be reasonable at the time
made."37 Issuers selling shares for non-cash consideration obviously must
be very careful as they near the $1 million limit; they risk losing the
exemption if the SEC subsequently disagrees with the reasonableness of
the valuation.
If the issuer has recently sold other securities, the Rule 504 maxi-
mum may be less than $1 million. The available dollar amount is reduced
by the aggregate offering price of certain securities sold during two time
periods: (1) within twelve months before the start of the Rule 504 offer-
ing, and (2) during the Rule 504 offering.38 The following three types of
offerings during these two time periods reduce the $1 million limit:3 9 (1)
other securities sold pursuant to Rule 504, (2) securities sold under
any exemption adopted pursuant to section 3(b) of the Securities Act,40
single offering between Rule 504 and some other exemption. The term "offering" is
not defined in either Regulation D or the Securities Act, but the SEC and the courts
generally follow a five-factor integration test to determine if ostensibly separate sales
of securities should be integrated and considered part of the same offering. See, e.g.,
Non-Public Offering Exemption, Securities Act Release No. 4552, 1 Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 2770 at 2781 (Nov. 6, 1982). Regulation D contains an integration safe
harbor that usually protects offers and sales from integration if they are more than six
months apart. 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(a).
33 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(c).
34 Id.
35 Id.
36 Id.
37 Id.
8 17 C.F.R. § 230.504(b) (2). This is separate from the possibility of integration.
39 Id.
o Section 3(b) authorizes the SEC to exempt any class of securities "if it finds
that the enforcement of this subchapter with respect to such securities is not
necessary in the public interest and for the protection of investors by reason of the
small amount involved or the limited character of the public offering." 15 U.S.C.
§ 77c(b) (1994). However, the SEC may exempt such an offering only if its aggregate
offering amount is $5 million or less. Id. The SEC has enacted several section 3(b)
exemptions, including Rules 504 and 505 of Regulation D, 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.504-.505;
Regulation A, 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.251-.263; and Regulation CE, 17 C.F.R. § 230.1001.
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and (3) securities sold in violation of section 5(a) of the Securities
Act.41
3. Notice of Sales
An issuer selling pursuant to the Rule 504 exemption must file a
Form D notice of sale with the SEC within fifteen days of the first sale of
securities. 4 2 This requirement is essentially toothless because filing the
Form D notice is not a condition of the exemption; an issuer is entitled to
the Rule 504 exemption whether or not it files the required notice.
43
However, if a court enjoins the issuer, its predecessors, or affiliates for
failing to properly file Form D, the issuer may not be able to obtain a
Rule 504 exemption in the future. 44
B. Conditions Added by the 1999 Amendments
Effective April 7, 1999, the SEC added two additional conditions to
Rule 504 offerings: (1) a ban on general solicitation and general advertis-
ing, and (2) restrictions on the resale of securities acquired in a Rule 504
offering. Those restrictions were already in Regulation D, but they did
not apply to Rule 504 offerings between 1992 and 1999. The 1999 amend-
ments also included exceptions to those conditions-situations where a
Rule 504 issuer does not have to comply with the two new conditions.
1. The Ban on General Solicitation
Prior to 1999, Regulation D limited the solicitation of offerees in
Rule 505 and Rule 506 offerings, but not in Rule 504 offerings. 45 Rule
504(b) (1), with some exceptions, now extends those manner-of-offering
restrictions to Rule 504 offerings as well. 4 6 Neither the issuer nor any
41 Section 5(a) says that securities may not be sold, assuming an interstate
commerce nexus, unless a registration statement is in effect. 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1994).
Thus sales of securities would violate section 5(a) and have to be deducted from the
$1 million limit, unless those sales were registered or the seller had an exemption
from registration.
42 17 C.F.R. § 230.503(a). The notice is considered filed when the SEC receives it
unless it is sent by registered or certified mail. Id. at (e) (1). If it is sent by registered or
certified mail, the filing date is the date it is mailed, as long as the SEC subsequently
receives it. Id. at (e)(2).
4' Regulation D; Accredited Investor and Filing Requirements, Securities Act
Release No. 6825, 54 Fed. Reg. 11,369, 11,370 (Mar. 20, 1989).
44 17 C.F.R. § 230.507(a). Even in these circumstances, the SEC, upon a showing
of good cause, may allow the issuer to use the exemption. Id. at (b).
45 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(c) (1998).
46 17 C.F.R. § 230.504(b) (1) (2000). The SEC's original proposal did not impose
any solicitation restrictions. See Revision of Rule 504 of Regulation D, the "Seed
Capital" Exemption, Securities Act Release No. 7541, 63 Fed. Reg. 29,168, 29,174
(proposed May 28, 1998). It did, however, solicit comments on the application of the
solicitation restrictions and the disclosure requirements of Regulation D to Rule 504
offerings. Id., at 29,170-71. It is unclear why the SEC eventually decided the
solicitation restrictions were also necessary. See Revision of Rule 504 of Regulation D,
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person acting on the issuer's behalf in a Rule 504 offering may "offer or
sell the securities by any form of general solicitation or general advertis-
ing."'4 7 This prohibition is specifically defined to include "(1) [a]ny adver-
tisement, article, notice or other communication published in any
newspaper, magazine, or similar media or broadcast over television or
radio; and (2) [a]ny seminar or meeting whose attendees have been
invited by any general solicitation or general advertising. 4 8
Rule 502(c) excludes communications pursuant to SEC Rules 135C
or 135E from the general solicitation prohibition, but those exclusions
will be of little use to the typical small business issuer using Rule 504. 4 9
Rule 135C, which is only available to Exchange Act reporting companies
and certain foreign issuers, 50 allows an issuer to publish a public notice
briefly describing exempt offerings.5 ' Rule 135E allows foreign issuers
engaged in offerings that are being conducted, at least in part, outside
the United States to communicate with journalists about the offering.52
A mass mailing to a large number of prospective investors clearly
would violate the general solicitation prohibition, 53 as would a newspaper
advertisement directed at investors. 54 But the SEC and its staff, primarily
in response to no-action letters, have gone beyond these obvious interpre-
tations of general solicitation. The SEC staff has indicated that the gen-
eral solicitation ban is violated if the issuer or persons acting on its behalf
do not have a preexisting business or substantive relationship with the
investors solicited 55 "that would enable the issuer (or a person acting on
its behalf) to be aware of the financial circumstances or sophistication of
the persons with whom the relationship exists or that otherwise are of
some substance and duration. 56
The SEC staff has relaxed the prohibition on solicitation by allowing
brokers to solicit potential Regulation D purchasers and establish a rela-
the "Seed Capital" Exemption, Securities Act Release No. 7644, 64 Fed. Reg. 11,090,
11,092-93 (Mar. 8, 1999).
47 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(c) (2000).
48 Id.
49 Id.
50 17 C.F.R. § 230.135c(a).
51 17 C.F.R. § 230.135c.
52 17 C.F.R. § 230.135e.
51 See Robert Testa, Securities Act Release No. 7018, [1993 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 85,241, at 84,627 (Sept. 29, 1993); Pa. Sec. Comm'n, SEC No-
Action Letter Uan. 16, 1990), 1990 WL 285794.
54 See 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(c)(1).
55 Kenman Corp., Exchange Act Release No. 21,962, [1984-85 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 83,767, at 87,428 n.6 (Apr. 19, 1985); Webster Mgmt.
Assured Return Equity Mgmt. Group Trust, SEC No-Action Letter, [1987 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 78,410, at 77,327 (Feb. 7, 1987); Interpretive
Release on Regulation D, Securities Act Release No. 6455, 1 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
2380, at 2637-13 (Mar. 3, 1983).
56 Mineral Lands Research & Mktg. Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, (Dec. 4, 1985),
1985 WL 55694, at *2.
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tionship in advance of the offering. The broker's solicitation itself can
establish the required substantive relationship if the questionnaire sent to
potential investors provides the broker "with sufficient information to
evaluate the prospective offerees' sophistication and financial circum-
stances."57 However, the relationship between the broker and the pur-
chaser must be established before the broker begins participating in the
particular Regulation D offering.58 Additionally, "there [must] be suffi-
cient time between establishment of the relationship and an offer so that
the offer is not considered made by general solicitation or advertising."
59
2. Resale Restrictions
The 1999 amendments also extended resale restrictions to Rule 504
offerings; these restrictions already applied to Rule 505 and Rule 506
offerings. 60 Before the 1999 amendments, securities acquired in a Rule
504 offering were unrestricted and freely resalable. Now, unless one of
the exceptions applies, securities acquired in a Rule 504 offering are
restricted securities and cannot be resold without registration or an
exemption from the registration requirement.6 1 Rule 504 purchasers will
now usually have to wait at least one year, possibly two, to resell and com-
ply with the other limitations of Rule 144,62 the most broadly applicable
resale safe harbor.63
In addition to the resale restrictions on purchasers, Rule 502(d)
imposes related obligations on Rule 504 issuers. Issuers in a Rule 504
offering must use reasonable care to assure that their purchasers are not
underwriters-in other words, that they are not purchasing with a view to
engage in a resale distribution. 64 An issuer satisfies its Rule 502(d) obliga-
tion if it takes the following three steps: (1) reasonable inquiry to deter-
mine if each purchaser is buying the security for himself or for someone
else, (2) written disclosure to each purchaser that the securities are
restricted, and (3) a legend on the securities noting the resale restric-
57 E. F. Hutton & Co., SEC No-Action Letter (Dec. 3, 1985), 1985 WL 55680, at
*4. See also IPONET, SEC No-Action Letter, [1996-1997 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 77,252, at 77,274 (July 26, 1996); Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc.,
SEC No-Action Letter, (Dec. 3, 1985), 1985 WL 55679, at *2.
58 E. F. Hutton & Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 1985 WL 55680, at *5; Bateman
Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1985 WL 55679, at *2.
59 E. F. Hutton & Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 1985 WL 55680, at *5.
60 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.502(d), .504(b)(1) (2000).
61 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(d).
62 17 C.F.R. § 230.144. Rule 144 allows resales after one year, id. at (d)(1), but
only if adequate current public information about the issuer is available. Id. at (c). If
the issuer does not satisfy that public information condition, as some small businesses
will not, the holding period is usually two years. See id. at (k).
63 Other resale safe harbors are available, but are more restrictive. Rule 144A
limits resale to qualified institutional buyers. 17 C.F.R. § 230.144A. Regulation A may
be used for resale, 17 C.F.R. § 230.251(b), but it requires the preparation of an
offering statement and an offering circular. Id. at (d) (1), (2).
6 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(d).
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tion.6 5 These three steps are not the exclusive means of satisfying the
reasonable care requirement,66 but the rule does not indicate what other
safeguards would suffice, so most issuers are likely to follow the three-step
safe harbor.
3. Exceptions to the New Conditions
Rule 504(b) (1) contains three exceptions to the restrictions on solic-
itation and resale. 67 All of those exceptions are keyed to state securities
law. If one of the exceptions applies, Rule 504 does not prohibit general
solicitation and the securities are freely resalable. Thus, when the Rule
504(b) (1) exceptions apply, Rule 504 is an essentially unconditional
exemption, as it was prior to 1999.
a. State Registration and Prospectus Delivery
Two of the three exceptions of Rule 504(b) (1) relate to state securi-
ties law registration and prospectus delivery requirements. The first
exception applies to offerings and sales exclusively within states in which
the securities are registered, if state law requires "the public filing and
delivery to investors of a substantive disclosure document before sale."68
The second exception allows an issuer to sell in states that do not require
registration and the delivery of a prospectus to investors to piggyback on
the requirements of other states. If sales are made in a state that does
provide for registration, public filing, and prospectus delivery before sale,
the exception applies if the required disclosure document is delivered
before sale to all purchasers, including those in the non-regulating
state.
69
b. State Accredited Investor Exemptions
The third exception applies when the issuer is selling the securities
pursuant to state law exemptions from registration that allow general
solicitation as long as actual sales are made only to accredited investors. 70
65 Id.
66 Id.
61 17 C.F.R. § 230.504(b)(1).
I Id. at (b)(1)(i).
69 Id. at (b) (1) (ii). The securities must be offered and sold in the state where the
registration is filed. This second exception would not allow a company to register in
State A, not sell any securities in State A, but use State A's disclosure document to sell
in State B. The second exception also would not allow State A's prospectus to be used
in State B if State B has a procedure for the registration of securities and delivery of a
disclosure document, even if the offering is exempted from those requirements in
State B. Revision of Rule 504 of Regulation D, the "Seed Capital" Exemption,
Securities Act Release No. 7644, 64 Fed. Reg. 11,090, 11,093, n.37 (Mar. 8, 1999).
70 17 C.F.R. § 230.504(b)(1)(iii). The term "accredited investor" is defined in
Rule 501 (a) of Regulation D and includes primarily wealthy individual investors and
institutional investors. 17 C.F.R. § 230.501 (a).
2001]
12 THE JOURNAL OF SMALL & EMERGING BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 5:1
Several states have adopted exemptions of this sort in recent years, 7' and
use of these exemptions frees the Rule 504 issuer from the general solici-
tation and resale restrictions of Regulation D. However, this exception to
the Rule 504 prohibitions is less useful than it might appear because, as
the SEC conceded when it adopted the Rule 504 amendments, many of
the state accredited investor exemptions themselves restrict resales and
solicitation.
72
III. A BRIEF HISTORY OF RULE 504 AND RELATED SMALL
OFFERING EXEMPTIONS
Both Rule 504's requirements and its justification have now come
full circle. Rule 504 was originally adopted in 1982 as an expansion of the
SEC's existing Rule 24073 and was limited to offerings with an aggregate
offering price of not more than $500,000.74 The SEC claimed that the
$100,000 limit in Rule 240 was "insufficient ... to be useful to even the
smallest businesses in need of financing," and that raising the ceiling
would be valuable to small businesses seeking venture capital for expan-
sion.7 5 The rationale for the new rule focused on the adequacy of state
regulation. 76 The SEC agreed with "the unanimous opinion expressed by
commentators ... that there is a need for a de minimis exemption from
federal regulation, and that state 'Blue Sky' requirements and the
antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws would afford adequate
protection."
77
Except for the dollar amount, the original version of Rule 504 was
similar to the current rule. Rule 504 offerings were subject to the prohibi-
tion on general solicitation and general advertising in Rule 502(c), and
the resale of Rule 504 securities was restricted. 78 However, Rule 504 offer-
ings and sales were exempt from these conditions if they were offered
and sold exclusively in states that required registration and delivery of a
disclosure document prior to sale.
79
71 For a list of states that have adopted an exemption for accredited investors, see
Qualified Institutional Buyer and Accredited Investor Exemptions, I Blue Sky L. Rep. (CCH)
6471 (Dec. 2000).
72 Securities Act Release No. 7644, 64 Fed. Reg. at 11,093 n.38.
71 Proposed Revision of Certain Exemptions from the Registration Provisions of
the Securities Act of 1933 for Transactions Involving Limited Offers and Sales,
Securities Act Release No. 6339, 46 Fed. Reg. 41,791, 41,793 (Aug. 18, 1981).
74 Revision of Certain Exemptions from Registration for Transactions Involving
Limited Offers and Sales, Securities Act Release No. 6389, 47 Fed. Reg. 11,251, 11,266
(Mar. 16, 1982).
75 Securities Act Release No. 6339, 46 Fed. Reg. at 41,800.
76 The adequacy of state registration was the express rationale for eliminating
the general solicitation and resale restrictions for state-registered offerings. Id. at
41,801.
77 Id. at 41,793; see also id. at 41,800.
78 Securities Act Release No. 6389, 47 Fed. Reg. at 11,266.
79 Rule 504(b) (1) provided:
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In 1988, the SEC increased Rule 504's aggregate offering price from
$500,000 to $1 million, but no more than $500,000 of this amount could
be sold in states that did not require registration.81 The SEC also broad-
ened the state registration exception to the general solicitation and resale
restrictions to include a piggybacking exception similar to the one in the
current rule.8 ' The SEC's focus was still on the adequacy of state
registration:
Where Rule 504 offerings are registered pursuant to the provisions
of the states' securities laws, the Commission believes that the costs
of compliance with additional federal requirements place an inor-
dinately heavy burden on these small offerings. Therefore, the
Commission believes it is consistent with the goals of section 3(b)
of the Securities Act and the needs for investor protection to
increase the availability of Rule 504 where the states are already
overseeing the offering process. 8
2
The release proposing the 1988 amendments also solicited com-
ments on "[p]roposals to raise the Rule 504 ceiling to $1 million without
limitation,"83 but the release adopting those amendments did not even
mention this issue.
84
Rule 504 was amended again in 1989 to require Rule 504 issuers to
advise purchasers prior to the sale about the Rule 502(d) restrictions on
resale, unless the purchasers were exempted from those restrictions.8 5
To qualify for exemption under this Section offers and sales must satisfy the terms
and conditions of §§ 230.501 through 230.503, except that the provisions of
§§ 230.502(c) and (d) shall not apply to offers and sales of securities under this
Section that are made exclusively in one or more states each of which provides for
the registration of the securities and requires the delivery of a disclosure
document before sale and that are made in accordance with those state
provisions.
Id.
0 Regulation D Revisions, Securities Act Release No. 6758, 47 Fed. Reg. 7866,
7869 (Mar. 10, 1988).
81 Id. The 1988 version of Rule 504 provided that the Rule 502(c) and (d)
conditions did not apply to offers and sales made:
(i) Exclusively in one or more states each of which provides for the registration of
the securities and requires the delivery of a disclosure document before sale and
that are made in accordance with those state provisions; or
(ii) In one or more states which have no provision for the registration of the
securities and the delivery of a disclosure document before sale, if the securities
have been registered in at least one state which provides for such registration and
delivery before sale, offers and sales are made in the state of registration in
accordance with such state provisions, and such document is in fact delivered to
all purchasers in the states which have no such procedure. ...
Id.
s Regulation D Revisions; Exemption for Certain Employee Benefit Plans,
Securities Act Release No. 6683, 52 Fed. Reg. 3015, 3018 (proposed Jan. 30, 1987).
83 Id.
84 See Securities Act Release No. 6758, 47 Fed. Reg. 7866.
15 Regulation D; Accredited Investor and Filing Requirements, Securities Act
Release No. 6825, 54 Fed. Reg. 11,369, 11,373 (Mar. 20, 1989).
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The SEC release proposing the 1989 changes also sought comments on
whether there should be a de minimis exception to the disclosure
requirement for "offerings of $50,000 or $100,000 or less." 86 The SEC
noted that the amendment "would make it impossible to rely on Rule 504
to provide an exemption for an issue that otherwise would comply with
the conditions of the exemption, albeit inadvertently," 87 but acceded to
the North American Securities Administrators Association's wishes that
the amendment be adopted as proposed.8 8
The most significant liberalization of Rule 504 came in 1992, as part
of the SEC's small business initiatives. 89 The 1992 amendments made
Rule 504 a virtually unconditional $1 million exemption. The $500,000
cap on sales in states that did not require registration was eliminated, as
were the general solicitation and resale restrictions.90 Although the SEC
releases proposing and adopting the 1992 amendments did not fully
explain the expansion of Rule 504, the focus was less on state registration
and more on the compliance costs for small businesses. 9 1 According to
the SEC, the 1992 amendments were designed to facilitate the ability of
small companies to raise seed capital by "facilitating access to the public
market for start-up and developing companies, and... lowering the costs
for small businesses that undertake to have their securities traded in the
public market."9
2
Until 1999, there were no other significant changes to Rule 504.9 3
The 1999 amendments to Rule 504 restored the rule to its pre-1992 for-
mat with one significant addition: the 1999 amendments created an
exception for offerings in compliance with state law exemptions for
accredited investors.9 4 The 1999 amendments do not, however, return
small business issuers to the 1992 status quo because the 1999 amend-
ments only partially reverse the SEC's 1992 changes. For the first time
since 1953, there is no essentially unrestricted exemption for small
offerings.
86 Regulation D; Independent Exemptions From Registration Requirements,
Securities Act Release No. 6812, 54 Fed. Reg. 309, 311 (proposed Jan. 5, 1989).
" Securities Act Release No. 6825, 54 Fed. Reg. at 11,371.
88 Id.
89 See Small Business Initiatives, Securities Act Release No. 6949, 57 Fed. Reg.
36,442 (Aug. 13, 1992).
90 Id. at 36,473.
9' See Small Business Initiatives, Securities Act Release No. 6924, 57 Fed. Reg.
9768 (proposed Mar. 20, 1992); Securities Act Release No. 6949, 57 Fed. Reg. 36,442.
92 Securities Act Release No. 6924, 57 Fed. Reg. at 9769.
13 The only amendment to Rule 504 between 1992 and 1999 came in 19 9 6-a
slight clarification to some confusing language in Regulation D to make it clear that
Rule 504 offerings were not subject to the information delivery requirements in Rule
502. See Phase One Recommendations of Task Force on Disclosure Simplification,
Securities Act Release No. 7300, 61 Fed. Reg. 30,397, 30,402 (June 14, 1996).
94 Revision of Rule 504 of Regulation D, the "Seed Capital" Exemption,
Securities Act Release No. 7655, 64 Fed. Reg. 11,090 (Mar. 8, 1999).
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TABLE A
Year
Exemption Adopted Amount Conditions
Rule 200, 1936 $30,000 Unconditional
Regulation A
Regulation A 1941 $100,000 Notice filing; advance filing of certain offering
materials; legend on securities
Regulation A 1953 $50,000 Notice filing with information about offering
Rule 257, 1957 $50,000 Notice filing with information about offering; limits
Regulation A on advertisements in newspapers, magazines, or
periodicals, or on radio or television
Rule 504, 1992 $1,000,000 Unconditional
Regulation D
Rule 504, 1999 $1,000,000 No general solicitation; resales restricted; notice
Regulation D filing
Table A shows the development of the least restrictive federal small
offering exemptions over the years. Rule 200 of the original Regulation
A, adopted in 1936, 95 provided a virtually unconditional federal exemp-
tion for offerings of $30,000 or less. 96 This is approximately $360,000 in
1999 dollars.97 A separate $100,000 exemption was available for offerings
that complied with state "registration, qualification and licensing" laws. 98
In 1941, the SEC repealed these and other Regulation A exemptions,
replacing them with a single $100,000 Regulation A exemption. 99 This
new Regulation A exemption required a notice filing with the SEC, the
advance filing of certain offering materials, and a legend on those offer-
ing materials, but the manner of the offering remained unrestricted.100
The basic structure of Regulation A remained unchanged, except for the
offering amount, until 1953.101 At that point, the SEC drastically altered
Regulation A to something roughly approximating its current structure,
95 3 Louis Loss &JOEL SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION 1322 (3d ed. 1999).
96 See 17 C.F.R. § 230.200 (1938).
" The average general consumer price index in 1936 was 13.9, compared to
166.2 in April 1999, when the Rule 504 amendments became effective (1982 to 1984 =
100). Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Dep't of Labor, Consumer Price Index at ftp://
ftp.bls.gov/pub/special requests/cpi/cpiai.txt (last modified Feb. 21, 2001). Using
these indices, $30,000 in 1936 is equivalent to $358,705 in 1999 dollars.
98 17 C.F.R. § 230.210 (1938).
" Securities Act Release No. 2410 (Dec. 3, 1940), 1940 WL 7107. The average
general consumer price index in 1941 was 14.7, compared to 166.2 in April 1999.
Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Dep't of Labor, Consumer Price Index at ftp://
ftp.bls.gov/pub/special requests/cpi/cpiai.txt (last modified Feb. 21, 2001). Thus,
this exemption was equivalent to $1,130,612 in 1999 dollars.
'0' Securities Act Release No. 2410, 1940 WL 7107, at *4-*6 (Rules 222, 223).
10' The offering amount was raised to $300,000 in 1945. See Securities Act
Release No. 3066 (May 22, 1945), 1945 WL 5273. This equates to over $2.7 million in
1999 dollars. See Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Dep't of Labor, Consumer Price
Index, at ftp://ftp.bls.gov/pub/special requests/cpi/cpiai.txt (last modified Feb. 21,
2001).
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requiring issuers to file an offering circular with the SEC and to deliver
that circular to offerees.10 2 However, the SEC preserved the basic exemp-
tion for smaller offerings by exempting offerings of $50,000 or less from
these requirements. 10 3 That is equivalent to roughly a $310,000 exemp-
tion in 1999 dollars. 10 4 In 1957, this de minimis exception became Rule
257.105 The SEC eliminated Rule 257 in 1992, because the 1992 amend-
ments to Rule 504 made it superfluous. 1 "6 Unfortunately, when the SEC
added the restrictions back to Rule 504 in 1999, it did not restore Rule
257 or anything like it. Now, for essentially the first time since 1953, there
is no unconditional federal exemption.
IV. THE EFFECT OF THE 1999 AMENDMENTS ON SMALL
BUSINESS ISSUERS
A. The Impact of the General Solicitation and Resale Restrictions
The 1999 amendments make Rule 504 a potential trap for unsophis-
ticated small business issuers. An unconditional exemption for small
offerings, such as Rule 504 from 1992 to 1999, protects issuers from "vio-
lating the statute in complete oblivion of the possibility" that federal
securities law might apply.10 7 State small offering exemptions often pro-
vide similar protection from state securities law. Now, a violation is almost
certain. Rule 504 requires issuers to register under state blue sky law, sell
only to accredited investors, or comply with the general solicitation and
resale restrictions of Regulation D. The unknowing issuer will not register
the offering, and it is unlikely that all of the offerees will be accredited
investors. Thus, unless the issuer inadvertently complies with the Regula-
tion D restrictions, which is unlikely,' 0 8 the offering will violate section 5
102 See Adoption of Revised Regulation A, Securities Act Release No. 3466 (Mar.
6, 1953), 1953 WL 5669, at *5 (Rule 219).
103 Id.
104 The average general consumer price index in 1953 was 26.7, compared to
166.2 in April 1999 (1982 to 1984 = 100). Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Dep't of
Labor, Consumer Price Index, at ftp://ftp.bls.gov/pub/special requests/cpi/cpiai.txt
(last modified Feb. 21, 2001). Using these indices, $50,000 in 1953 is equivalent to
$311,236 in 1999 dollars.
115 See Adoption of Revised Regulation A and the Consolidation Therein of
Regulation D, Securities Act Release No. 3663 (July 23, 1956), 1956 WL 7217, at *9.
100 Small Business Initiatives, Securities Act Release No. 6924, 57 Fed. Reg. 9768,
9773 (proposed Mar. 20, 1992); Small Business Initiatives, Securities Act Release No.
6949, 57 Fed. Reg. 36,442, 36,445 (Aug. 13, 1992).
107 See Louis Loss, COMMENTARY ON THE UNIFORM SECURITIES AcT 128 (1976)
(referring to the possible application of state blue sky law in drafters' commentary to
section 402(b)(9) of the Uniform Act). The section 402(b)(9) exemption was
designed to remove or minimize the possibility of such "innocently assumed
contingent civil liabilities." Id.
108 If the issuer has a preexisting relationship with all of his offerees, there will be
no general solicitation. See supra text accompanying notes 55-59. This may sometimes
be the case when the issuer limits the offering to friends and relatives. However, even
small business issuers often reach beyond their stable of close friends and relatives to
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of the Securities Act. 119 A violation of section 5 will give purchasers a
virtually unlimited right to rescind their purchases if things go badly' 10
and will also allow the SEC to pursue the issuer.I'
The impact of the 1999 amendments on more sophisticated issuers
who are aware of the federal securities law requirements is equally dra-
matic. The prohibition of general solicitation is especially burdensome
for a small business, because a greater selling effort is needed for a rela-
tively unknown company. 1 2 Recently, the Internet has become a com-
mon source of public funds for small businesses,'" 3 and most of those
offerings have used one of the exemptions from federal registration.' 14
Prior to 1999, Rule 504 was commonly used, because the ability to solicit
investors and publicly advertise the offering made the Rule 504 exemp-
tion highly amenable to Internet offerings. 1 5 Now, it would violate Rule
502(c) for a company to post offering materials on an Internet site, even
if the company collected information from the offerees before the offer-
ees could access the materials.t
1 6
The exception created by the SEC staff for brokers' pre-developed
customer lists would be of less use to small business issuers than to larger
companies. Many brokers will not participate in Rule 504 offerings
because they are not cost-effective from the broker's standpoint.' 17 This
makes it difficult for small business issuers to locate investors, because a
typical small business will not have an established list of interested inves-
tors. It is not surprising that the SEC-sponsored Government-Business
Forum on Small Business Capital Formation has in recent years called for
investors with whom no preexisting relationship exists. Moreover, even if there is no
general solicitation, the issuer is unlikely to have exercised "reasonable care to assure
that the purchasers of the securities are not underwriters within the meaning of
section [2(a)(11)] of the Act." 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(d) (2000).
0, 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1994).
110 15 U.S.C. § 77l(a)(1) (Supp. V 1999) (making any seller who offers or sells in
violation of section 5 of the Securities Act liable to the purchaser for the
consideration paid).
"'1 15 U.S.C. § 77t (1994 & Supp. V 1999) (giving the SEC the power to seek an
injunction against violations of the Securities Act and to recover civil penalties).
1"' Roger D. Blanc, The Securities and Exchange Commission's Small Business
Initiatives, 792 PRAc. L. INST./CoRP. 347, 352 (1992).
"' Lisa A. Mondschein, Note, The Solicitation and Marketing of Securities Offerings
Through the Internet, 65 BROOK. L. REV. 185, 185 (1999).
"'I Id. at 186; Hass, supra note 22, at 77.
115 Mondschein, supra note 113, at 196. But see Hass, supra note 22, at 82-84
(stating that even after 1992, Regulation A had advantages over Rule 504 for Internet
offerings).
116 Use of Electronic Media, Securities Act Release No. 7856, [2000 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 86,304, at 83,386-88 (Apr. 28, 2000); Use of
Electronic Media for Delivery Purposes, Securities Act Release No. 7234, [1996-1996
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 3200, (Oct. 6, 1995).
117 DIy. CORP. FIN., SEC, FINAL REPORT OF THE SEC GOVERNMENT-BUSINESS FORUM
ON SMALL BUSINESS CAPITAL FORMATION (July 1999), www.sec.gov/smbus/
finrepl7.htm.
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the elimination of the Regulation D general solicitation restriction or the
creation of a new exemption that allows general solicitation.' 18
The exclusions from the general solicitation ban for Rule 135C and
Rule 135E communications will also have little, if any, utility to most small
business issuers. 1 9 Rule 135C is limited to Exchange Act reporting com-
panies and certain foreign issuers, 120 and reporting companies are ineli-
gible to use the Rule 504 exemption. 121 Rule 135e is available only to
foreign issuers for offerings that are being made, at least in part, outside
the United States. 122
The resale restrictions also impose a burden on small business issu-
ers. The issuer's Rule 502(d) duty to exercise reasonable care with
respect to resales imposes an additional compliance cost. More impor-
tantly, Rule 504 securities will be less liquid with the restrictions, which
"could cause [small business] issuers to offer higher discounts in the sales
of their securities, which may increase their overall cost for capital."123
The SEC argued that the new Rule 504 restrictions could also have a
positive effect on small business issuers. The 1999 changes were designed
by the SEC to prevent fraud in the market for the securities of so-called
microcap companies, companies with "thin capitalization, low share
prices, and little or no analyst coverage.' 24 The SEC pointed out that
"[i]f the microcap market, or offerings under Rule 504, become stigma-
tized as unsavory, legitimate small businesses may become less able to
raise money as investors lose confidence in the market and in the integ-
rity of those making such offerings."1 25 In other words, shady deals could
impose negative externalities on good deals, making investors less willing
"18 See, e.g., DIv. CORP. FIN., SEC, FINAL REPORT OF THE SEC GOVERNMENT-
BUSINESS FORUM ON SMALL BUSINESS CAPITAL FORMATION (Mar. 2000), www.sec.gov/
smbus/finerepl8.htm (proposing a new $10 million exemption allowing general
solicitation); Drv. CORP. FIN., SEC, FINAL REPORT OF THE SEC GOVERNMENT-BUSINESS
FORUM ON SMALL BUSINESS CAPITAL FORMATION (June 1998), www.sec.gov/smbus/
finerepl6.htm (calling for elimination of the ban on general solicitation for Rule 505
and Rule 506 offerings, but retention of the ban on general advertising); Div. CORP.
FIN., SEC, FINAL REPORT OF THE SEC GOVERNMENT-BUSINESS FORUM ON SMALL CAPITAL
FORMATION (June 1997), www.sec.gov/smbus/finerepl5.htm (calling for the
elimination of the general solicitation ban for all Regulation D offerings).
119 See supra text accompanying notes 49-52.
120 17 C.F.R. § 230.135c(a) (2000).
121 17 C.F.R. § 230.504(a)(1).
122 17 C.F.R. § 230.135e.
123 Revision of Rule 504 of Regulation D, the "Seed Capital" Exemption,
Securities Act Release No. 7541, 63 Fed. Reg. 29,168, 29,172 (proposed May 28,
1998).
124 Id. at 29,169.
125 Id. at 29,170. If, as the SEC conceded, fraudulent offerings under Rule 504
were only a small percentage of all Rule 504 offerings, it is difficult to understand why
those few fraudulent offerings would stigmatize the entire Rule 504 market.
Moreover, any Rule 504 issuers concerned about the stigma could use the Rule 505
exemption instead, with the same general solicitation and resale restrictions and a
greater dollar amount-but subject to a cap on the number of purchasers.
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to invest in Rule 504 offerings generally. Legitimate businesses could
either be driven out of the capital markets entirely or, more likely, be
forced to accept a lower price for their securities. 126 The policy issue, as
the SEC saw it, was whether "the cost to small businesses of restricting the
solicitation methods permitted by Rule 504 [would] be outweighed by
the benefits from avoiding a taint to Rule 504."127
The SEC indicated that the capital markets have changed signifi-
candy since 1992, when Rule 504 was liberalized. Technological changes,
particularly the development and increased use of the Internet, have cre-
ated nationwide trading of securities sold in exempt offerings.1 28 The
SEC believed that this market development, the lack of widely-distributed
public information about companies making Rule 504 offerings, and the
freely tradable nature of Rule 504 securities may have exacerbated the
opportunities for microcap fraud. 129 Securities sold in Rule 504 offerings
were being used to facilitate fraudulent secondary transactions through
the OTC Bulletin Board operated by the National Association of Securi-
ties Dealers (NASD) and the pink sheets distributed by the National Quo-
tation Bureau. t 30 Securities were sold to nominees in states without
registration or prospectus delivery requirements, then fraudulently resold
to unknowing investors at higher prices by brokers using cold-calling
techniques, a scheme sometimes referred to as "pump and dump."1 3 1
The release adopting the 1999 amendments to Rule 504 identified six
civil actions and one administrative proceeding involving Rule 504
securities. 132
The SEC conceded that "the scope of abuse is small in relation to the
actual usage of the [Rule 504] exemption."' 33 By depriving small business
of a valuable exemption to prevent a relatively small amount of fraud, the
SEC may have thrown the baby out with the bath water.13 4 Moreover, the
126 See George A. Akerlof, The Market for "Lemons:" Quality Uncertainty and the
Market Mechanism, 84 Q. J. ECON. 488 (1970).
127 Securities Act Release No. 7541, 63 Fed. Reg. at 29,171.
128 Id. at 29,170.
129 Id.
130 Id. at 29,169.
13' Revision of Rule 504 of Regulation D, the "Seed Capital" Exemption,
Securities Act Release No. 7644, 64 Fed. Reg. 11,090, 11,091 (Mar. 8, 1999).
132 Id. at 11,091 nn.14-15.
s Securities Act Release No. 7541, 63 Fed. Reg. at 29,169.
13 As SEC Commissioner Norman S.Johnson stated in commenting on a related
proposal to amend SEC Rule 15c2-11:
Combating fraud-whether it involves microcap or large cap securities-is the
Commission's overreaching mission. But it is certainly possible to "throw out the
baby with the bath water." We cannot allow the existence of fraud to serve as a
justification for measures that might effectively preclude many deserving smaller
companies from accessing capital markets.
Norman S. Johnson, Small Business: The Lifeblood of Our Nation's Economy,
Remarks at the 18th Annual Government-Business Forum on Small Business Capital
Formation (Sept. 13, 1999), http://www.sec.gov/news/speeches/spch292.htm.
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SEC actions cited in the Rule 504 releases all involved allegations of fraud
and manipulation in violation of the existing securities laws, 135 as have
more recent actions involving microcap securities.1 3 6 If these allegations
are correct, no new enforcement tools were needed.137 Moreover, the
NASD recently toughened its regulation of the bulletin board market,
where much of the problem was centered.' 38 Finally, it is unclear why the
SEC believed wrongdoers, willing to violate the existing rules against
fraud and manipulation, would have any qualms about selling securities
in violation of the registration requirements of the Securities Act. The
only real effect of the 1999 amendments may be to deter legitimate small
businesses seeking to raise capital.
B. Do the 1999 Amendments Really Change Anything?
The SEC contended that most Rule 504 issuers would have "no addi-
tional costs of compliance" because they had to comply with state registra-
tion and prospectus delivery requirements even before the 1999
amendments.' 39 Issuers complying with those state requirements are still
exempted from the general solicitation and resale restrictions, so the
1999 amendments do not affect them. The only real impact of the
amendments, according to the SEC, is on issuers making offerings in the
jurisdictions that do not require registration, New York and the District of
Columbia.'
40
Clearly, the 1999 amendments will have a dramatic impact on offer-
ings in New York and the District of Columbia, fraud-only jurisdictions
135 See Spacedev, Inc., Securities Act Release No. 7561 (Aug. 6, 1998), 1998 WL
454103, at *2 (alleging material misrepresentations in violation of section 17(a) of the
Securities Act and Rule lOb-5); SEC v. Szur, Litigation Release No. 15595 (Dec. 18,
1997), www.sec.gov/enforce/litigrel/lr15595.txt (alleging manipulation of market
prices and material misrepresentations in violation of various provisions of the
Securities Act and the Exchange Act and related rules); SEC v. Millennium Software
Solutions, Inc., Litigation Release No. 15583 (Dec. 8, 1997), http://www.sec.gov/
enforce/litigrel/r15583.txt (alleging material misrepresentations in violation of
section 17(a) of the Securities Act and Rule 1Ob-5). See also, Michael Schroeder, Penny
Stock Fraud is Again on a Resurgence, Bolstered by Loopholes and New Technolog,, WALL ST. J.
12 (Sept. 4, 1997), cited in Securities Act Release No. 7541, 63 Fed. Reg. at 29,169 n.10
and Securities Act Release No. 7644, 64 Fed. Reg. at 11,091 n.14. The Wall Street
Journal article calls Rule 504 "a popular loophole for fraud." Id.
136 See SEC, SEC, U.S. Attorney, and FBI Announce Major Attack Against Microcap
Fraud (June 14, 2000), www.sec.gov/news/press/2000-81.txt; SEC v. Follick, Litigation
Release No. 16588 (June 14, 2000), www.sec.gov/enforce/litigrel/lr16588.txt.
137 The Rule 504 amendments would make it easier for SEC to win these cases
because it would no longer have to prove fraud or manipulation. With the new Rule
504 resale restrictions, any resales would violate Section 5 of the Securities Act,
whether or not fraud or manipulation was involved.
138 Phyllis Plitch and Michael Rapoport, NASD Talks Up Strong New Rules on
Bulletin Board, WALL ST. J.,June 22, 2000, at Cl (reporting that NASD is introducing
trading halts and tougher eligibility rules for Bulletin Board shares).
131 Securities Act Release No. 7644, 64 Fed. Reg. at 11,093.
140 Id.
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that have no general state-level registration requirements.' 4' An issuer
making a Rule 504 offering in those jurisdictions must either comply with
the federal general solicitation and resale restrictions or piggyback on the
prospectus delivery requirement of some other state to be exempted
from those restrictions. On the other hand, if an offering is registered in
all the states in which it is made, the 1999 amendments will have no effect
at all. Rule 504's exception for state-registered offerings, assuming pro-
spectus delivery is required, would free the issuer from the general solici-
tation and resale restrictions.
Unfortunately, the SEC's analysis is incomplete. Prior to 1999, an
issuer could have combined a state exemption from state registration
requirements with the Rule 504 exemption from federal registration
requirements. 4 2 Now, if the offering is exempt at the state level, the
issuer must comply with the federal general solicitation and resale restric-
tions, unless the accredited investor exception applies. To avoid the fed-
eral restrictions, the issuer must register and distribute a prospectus at
the state level.
A number of state exemptions might have been used in conjunction
with the pre-1999 Rule 504 exemption. Almost every U.S. jurisdiction that
requires registration also provides some sort of limited offering exemp-
tion, although those exemptions vary widely.' 43 Many state limited-offer-
ing exemptions follow or are modeled on the limited-offering exemption
in the Uniform Securities Act. 144 Section 402(b) (9) of the 1956 Uniform
Securities Act is probably "the most used of all the [state] exemptions in
terms of the number of transactions covered."1 45 It exempts offerings to
no more than ten persons in the state, excluding financial institutions
and other institutional buyers from the ten-offeree limit. 14 6 In addition,
the state securities administrator may increase or decrease the allowed
number of offerees.147 Many states have raised the original ten-person
limit, and some of those exemptions focus on the number of purchasers
rather than the number of offerees.148
141 LONG, supra note 12, at 1-77. New York requires the registration of certain real
estate-related securities. Id. at 1-77 n.59.
142 This would not have been possible for all offerings. Many offerings exempted
by Rule 504 would still have had to be registered at the state level. But some small
offerings could have avoided regulation at both the state and federal levels.
... I BLUE SKv REGULATION (A.A. Sommer, Jr. ed., 2000), at 5-29 (2000).
144 id.
145 LONG, supra note 12, at 549.
141 1956 UNIF. SEC. AcT § 402(b) (9), 7C U.L.A. 220 (2000).
"' Id. The official comment to section 402(b) (9) indicates, for example, that the
administrator "may want to ... increase [the limit] for a close corporation which
wants to solicit twenty or thirty friends or relatives of the owners for additional
capital." 1956 UNIF. SEC. AcT § 402(b) (9) cmt., 7C U.L.A. at 223.
148 LONG, supra note 12, at 5-54; 1985 UNIF. SEC. Acr § 401 (11) cmt., 7C U.L.A. at
62-63.
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General solicitation and advertising are not expressly prohibited in a
section 402(b) (9) offering, but the ten-offeree limitation effectively pro-
hibits any public advertising or large-scale solicitation. 149 The exemption
does not contain any specific restrictions on resale, but the issuer must
reasonably believe that all purchasers in the state are purchasing for
investment. 150 Commissions are also restricted.
5 1
Section 402 (11) of the revised Uniform Securities Act,152 adopted in
1985, continues the small offering exemption in an altered form. The
revised exemption limits the transaction to no more than twenty-five pur-
chasers in any twelve-month period, both increasing the number and
shifting the focus from offerees to actual purchasers. As before, financial
institutions and other institutional investors are excluded from the
count.' 53 General solicitation and general advertising are expressly pro-
hibited, but the investment intent requirement is eliminated for issuers
with fifty or fewer beneficial owners, excluding financial institutions and
institutional investors, if the aggregate offering amount in any twelve-
month period does not exceed $500,000.1 54
Another possible 1956 Uniform Act exemption for a Rule 504 offer-
ing is section 402(b) (11), continued in essentially the same form as sec-
tion 402(14) of the 1985 Uniform Securities Act. 155 Section 402(b) (11)
exempts offerings by an issuer to its existing security holders where no
commission is paid for solicitation. 156 The only additional requirement is
a notice filing with the state securities administrator.
1 57
Other non-uniform state exemptions might also be used with the
Rule 504 federal exemption. A few states have exemptions coordinated
with the federal Rule 504 exemption; offerings that qualify for Rule 504
do not have to be registered at the state level.' 5 8 However, these state
exemptions typically restrict resales or bar general solicitation and adver-
tising, so the recent Rule 504 amendments will not have a drastic effect
on their use. 1 5 9
149 LONG, supra note 12, at 5-51 to -52.
150 1956 UNIF. SEC. Acr § 402(b) (9), 7C U.L.A. at 220.
151 Id.
152 1985 UNIF. SEC. Acr § 402(11), 7C U.L.A. at 59.
153 Id.
154 id.
155 1956 UNIF. SEC. Ac-r § 402(b) (11), 7C U.L.A. at 220-2 1; 1985 UNIF. SEC. Acr
§ 402(14), 7C U.L.A. at 60.
156 1956 UNIF. SEC. Acr § 402(b) (11), 7C U.L.A. at 220-21.
157 Id.
158 See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 36b-21(b) (West Supp. 2000); 808 Ky. ADMIN.
RECs. 10:210 (West, WESTLAW through Oct. 1, 2000); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71,
§ 401(b) (10) (B) (Supp. 2001); S.D. ADMIN. R. § 20:08:06:14.01 (West, WESTLAW
through Jan. 1, 2001).
1-59 See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 36b-21 (b) (restricting resales). See also 808 Ky.
ADMIN. REGS. 10:210 § 1(3) (a), (b) (prohibiting general solicitation or advertising
and requiring investment intent); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 401 (b) (10) (B) (ii)
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A number of other states have exemptions tied to the dollar amount
of the offering. These exemptions typically limit the aggregate amount of
the offering, 16° often limit the exemption to companies with substantial
contacts with the state, 161 and sometimes impose additional restric-
tions.162 These exemptions might also have been coordinated with Rule
504 prior to the 1999 amendments. Therefore, the SEC's argument that
only New York and D.C. offerings are affected is incomplete.
V. WHY AN UNCONDITIONAL SMALL OFFERING EXEMPTION
IS NEEDED
The 1999 amendments to Rule 504 impose a significant regulatory
burden on small businesses. But why exempt small business offerings in
the first place? The 1999 amendments are problematic only if there is a
valid policy reason to give small offerings an unconditional exemption
from registration.
The argument for an unconditional small offering exemption turns
on the basic premise that government regulation is senseless if the cost of
the regulation exceeds the benefit. We should not pay a million dollars to
prevent a thousand dollar loss. Registration should be required only
when the expected gain from registration exceeds its expected cost 1 6 3 As
(prohibiting general solicitation or advertising). But see S.D. ADMIN. R.
§ 20:08:06:14.01.
160 See TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-2-103(b) (6) (Lexis Supp. 2000) (limiting to
$250,000 during any 12-month period); 815 ILL. ANN. STAT. 5/4(G) (1) (a) (West
1999).
161 See N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-04-06(9) (b) (3) (1999) (limiting the exemption to
issuers organized under N.D. law with their principal place of business in N.D.). See
also Wis. ADMIN. CODE § 2.028 (West, WESTLAW through Jan. 2001 Reg. No. 541)
(limiting the exemption to issuers with both principal office and majority of full-time
employees in Wisconsin.).
162 See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 8-13B-27(J) (2), (4) (Michie Supp. 2000) (limiting the
exemption to companies with at least 80% of proceeds used in N.M.; offering
document delivered to purchasers prior to sale). See also N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-04-
06(9) (b) (4), (8) (allowing no public advertising or general solicitation and requiring
funds to be escrowed until total amount of offering sold); Wis. ADMIN. CODE
§ 2.028(6) (stating that issuer must have reasonable belief that the securities are
suitable for the purchasers and that the purchasers are sophisticated).
16 Section 2(b) of the Securities Act requires the SEC, when engaged in
rulemaking, to consider not only investor protection, but also "whether the action will
promote efficiency, competition, and capital formation." 15 U.S.C. § 77b (Supp. V
1999). Congress expected this requirement to generate "serious economic analysis" of
proposed rules. See S. REP. No. 104-293, at 16 (1996), http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/
cpquery/L?cpl04:./list/cplO4cs.lst:l. See also H.R. REP. No. 104-622, at 39 (1996),
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/cpquery/L?cplO4:./list/cplO4ch.lst:l. For SEC's
section 2(b) analyses of the 1999 Rule 504 amendments, see Revision of Rule 504 of
Regulation D, the "Seed Capital" Exemption, Securities Act Release No. 7541, 63 Fed.
Reg. 29,168, 29,172-73 (proposed May 28, 1998); Revision of Rule 504 of Regulation
D, the "Seed Capital" Exemption, Securities Act Release No. 7644, 64 Fed. Reg.
11,090, 11,093 (Mar. 8, 1999).
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a result of economies of scale for relatively small offerings, the cost of
registration, or of any partial regulation short of a full registration
requirement, exceeds the benefits registration provides.'6 It is impossi-
ble to measure precisely the benefits of Securities Act registration, so it is
impossible to specify what the exact dollar amount of an unconditional
exemption should be. However, it is possible to prove the desirability of
some unconditional small offering exemption.
I will begin by discussing the costs and benefits of registration. Then,
posing a simple choice between full registration of offerings and a com-
plete exemption, I will develop a model to demonstrate that offerings
below a certain size should be exempted. Later, I will relax the all-or-
nothing analysis and consider intermediate levels of regulation that are
less burdensome than a full registration requirement, such as Rule 504 in
its current form. Using the same basic model, I will demonstrate that
offerings below a certain size should be exempted even from this inter-
mediate-level regulation.
A. The Cost of Registration
The cost to register a securities offering is substantial and consumes
a larger portion of the funds raised in small offerings than in larger offer-
ings, due to economies of scale in the registration process. A federal
registration requirement is, therefore, an absolute bar to the very smallest
offerings and a substantial impediment to slightly larger offerings.
Registration involves legal fees, accounting fees, printing costs, filing
fees, and other miscellaneous costs, along with a significant discount paid
to the underwriters. The total expense is hundreds of thousands of dol-
lars. These external costs are in addition to the time consumed by the
company's own employees in preparation for registration. Some of these
costs are fixed; they do not vary with the size of the offering. For example,
many of the legal and accounting costs do not vary with the size of the
offering. The cost to prepare a registration statement, including audited
financial statements, is essentially the same whether the company is sell-
ing $500 or $500 million dollars of securities.1 65 Other costs are variable;
they increase with the size of the offering.
In 1981, Carl Schneider, Joseph Manko, and Robert Kant estimated
that the total cost of a registered public offering would be in the $175,000
to $350,000 range, plus an underwriting discount or commission of seven
164 The analysis here draws in part on my earlier economic analysis of the various
transaction exemptions to the Securities Act registration requirement. See C. Steven
Bradford, Transaction Exemptions in the Securities Act of 1933: An Economic Analysis, 45
EMORY Lj. 591 (1996).
165 The SEC has provided special registration statements available for smaller
companies. See SEC, Small Business Forms and Regulations, Forms SB-1, SB-2, http://
www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/forms/smallbus.shtml. I consider the possibility of
less stringent regulation for small businesses later in the article. For now, I assume a
single registration requirement for all companies.
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to ten percent of the offering price.1 66 In 1998, the SEC estimated that
registration on Form S-1 required 1267 hours of work by a company's
internal staff and external professionals. 167 The comparable figures for
other registration statements were: 470 hours for Form S-2, 398 hours for
Form S-3, 710 hours for Form SB-i, and 876 hours for Form SB-2.168
Using the SEC's estimate that seventy-five percent of these hours would
involve external professional help at an approximate cost of $175 per
hour,169 an average issuer will pay professional fees of $52,000 to
$166,000 to register an offering. The SEC estimates that, for Form S-1
offerings, the median underwriter spread was 7% and the median fees
were 2.3% of the total offering price.170 The figures for offerings on
Form SB-2, the small business registration form, were even higher. The
median underwriter spread for SB-2 offerings was 10% and the median
fees were 7.4% of the offering price. 171
Moreover, there are significant economies of scale. The highest costs
per dollar raised in the SEC study were for initial public offerings on
Form SB-2, with a median offering amount of $6.1 million. 172 The costs
were lower on a percentage basis for Form S-2 offerings, with a median
offering amount of $30.1 million, and lowest for Form S-3 offerings, with
a median offering amount of $131.7 million.1 73 The percentage of the
offering price going to underwriters and fees was even lower for repeat
offerings by companies that were already public.1 74 The conclusion of the
Advisory Committee on the Capital Formation and Regulatory Processes
was unequivocal: "For smaller companies and newer entrants to the capi-
tal markets, the fees paid to the Commission, state regulators, account-
ants, lawyers, underwriters, and financial printers amount to a larger
percentage of offering proceeds than for more seasoned issuers." 175
The Advisory Committee's conclusions mirror the results of several
earlier academic studies, all of which found both substantial costs and
significant economies of scale in registered public offerings. One of the
earliest studies, by George Benston, examined public offerings of debt in
166 Carl W. Schneider, et al., Going Public: Practice, Procedure, and Consequences, 27
ViLE. L. REv. 1, 29-31 (1981).
167 Regulation of Securities Offerings, Securities Act Release No. 7606A, 63 Fed.
Reg. 67,174, 67,257 (proposed Dec. 4, 1998).
168 Id.
]69 See id. at 67,258-60.
170 Report of the Advisory Committee on Capital Formation and Regulatory
Processes, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) Special Report No. 1725, at 45, tbl. 1 (July 24,
1996), http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/capform.htm. These figures were for
registered public offerings of common stock from 1993 through 1995.
171 Id.
172 Id.
173 Id.
174 Id. at 46, tbl. lb.
175 Id. at 44.
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1951, 1953, and 1955.176 Benston found the total costs were 10.24% of
total proceeds for offerings in the $500,000 to $999,999 range, compared
to 1.22% for offerings of $20 million or more. 177 Benston also found that
the cost difference between registered offerings and private placements
was inversely related to the size of the offering. The smaller the offering,
the greater the difference between the cost of a registered offering and
the cost of a private placement. 178 As a result of such economies of scale,
"the registration system operates as a regressive tax based on the size of
the issue and presumably, therefore, the issuer."179 Clifford W. Smith, Jr.
reviewed 484 common stock offerings from 1971 to 1975 and also found
that the average cost of the offerings was inversely related to their size. 180
Total expenses averaged 3.95% of offerings in the $100 million to $500
million range, compared to 13.74% for offerings of $500,000 to $999,999
and 15.29% for offerings of $1 million to $1.99 million. 18 1 Jay Ritter
examined .1028 underwritten initial public offerings from 1977 to 1982
and found that, for both firm commitment underwritings and best effort
underwritings, the underwriting discount and other cash expenses as a
percentage of the offering amount varied inversely with the size of the
offering. 182 The total cash expenses varied from 20.15% of the proceeds
in best efforts offerings in the $100,000 to $1,999,999 range to 9.34% for
firm commitment offerings of $10 million or more.' 83
More recent academic studies confirm these results. Inmoo Lee,
Scott Lockhead, Jay Ritter, and Quanshi Zhao looked at public debt and
equity offerings from 1990 through 1994.184 They found that the average
total direct cost of initial public offerings of equity, including short-run
underpricing, ranged from 25.16% of the proceeds for offerings of $2
million to $9.99 million to 10.36% for offerings of $500 million or
more. 185 They found similar differences for both investment-grade and
noninvestment-grade bond offerings. 186 Significantly for emerging small
businesses, the costs of equity offerings also varied between initial public
176 George J. Benston, The Effectiveness and Effects of the SEC's Accounting Disclosure
Requirements, in ECONOMIC POLICY AND THE REGULATION OF CORPORATE SECURITIES 23
(Henry G. Manne ed., 1969).
17 Id. at 62. Benston's results appear in Table 1 of Appendix A to this Article.
178 Id.
17 Henry G. Manne, Economic Aspects of Required Disclosure Under Federal Securities
Laws, in WALL STREET IN TRANSmON: THE EMERGING SYSTEM AND ITS IMPACT ON THE
ECONOMY 21, 49 (Henry G. Manne & Ezra Solomon eds., 1974).
180 Clifford W. Smith, Jr., Alternative Methods for Raising Capital: Rights Versus
Underuritten Offerings, 5J. FIN. ECON. 273, 277 (1977).
181 Id. Smith's results appear in Table 2 of Appendix A to this Article.
182 Jay R. Ritter, The Costs of Going Public, 19 J. FIN. ECON. 269, 272 (1987).
183 Id. Ritter's results appear in Table 3 of Appendix A to this Article.
18 Inmoo Lee et al., The Costs of Raising Capita4 19 J. FIN. RES. 59 (1996).
185 Id. at 67, tbl. 4. The full results appear in Table 4 of Appendix A to this
Article.
186 Id. at 66, tbl. 3. The full results appear in Table 5 of Appendix A to this
Article.
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offerings and offerings by seasoned issuers. For example, the average cost
of an equity offering in the $2 million to $9.99 million range, excluding
short-run underpricing, was 16.96% of the proceeds in an initial public
offering, but only 13.28% of the proceeds in an offering by a seasoned
issuer. 187
A study by Christopher Barry, Chris Muscarella, and Michael Vet-
suypens examined all initial public offerings of the common stock of
industrial companies from January 1983 through May 1987.188 Unlike
some of the other studies, they included as a cost the value of stock war-
rants given to underwriters. They found that the average cost of an offer-
ing without underwriter warrants ranged from 23.21% of the proceeds
for an offering of $100,000 to $1.99 million to 13.66% for an offering of
$10 million or more.189 For offerings with underwriter warrants, the aver-
age cost across the same range varied from 39.06% to 22.81% of the
proceeds. 19 0
Another significant cost of the registration process is delay. For an
initial public offering of common stock by a domestic issuer, the average
delay between filing the registration statement and its effectiveness
depends on the type of registration. The average delay in an initial stock
offering for registrants using the small business forms, SB-1 and SB-2, was
103.7 days, compared to only 78.1 days for registrants using the more
generally available Form S-1.191 For some offerings, the delay is signifi-
candy longer. 19 2 Repeat offerings by companies that were already public
involved significantly less delay, anywhere from 32.1 to 68.2 days between
filing and effectiveness.1 9 3 Again, the delay was longer for companies
using Form SB-2.194
187 Id. at 62, tbl. 1. The full results for equity offerings appear in Table 6 of
Appendix A to this Article.
188 Christopher Barry et al., Undenrriter Warrants, Underwriter Compensation, and the
Costs of Going Public, 29 J. FIN. ECON. 113 (1991). The authors limited their study to
offerings announced on the DowJones News Wire or in the Wall StreetJournal, thus
excluding small offerings by little-known companies. Id. at 120.
189 Id. at 128-29, tbl. 5. The exact percentages varied depending on the particular
method used to compute costs, but the results were consistent regardless of the
method. The full results for one method appear in Table 7 of Appendix A to this
Article.
190 Id. Again, the exact percentages varied depending on how costs were
calculated.
191 Report of the Advisory Committee on Capital Formation and Regulatory
Processes, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) at 48, tbl. 2. This does not, of course, include the
substantial amount of time necessary to get ready to file.
192 Id. at 74, tbl. 5 (showing distribution of waiting periods for offerings of
additional common stock, not initial offerings).
193 Id. at 48, tbl. 2.
194 The average delay for repeat offers of common stock by domestic issuers was
68.2 days for firms using Form SB-2, 52.2 days for firms using Form S-1 or S-2, and
32.1 days for non-shelf registrations on Form S-3. Id.
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B. The Benefits of Registration
To determine the efficiency of the Securities Act registration require-
ment, we must compare the costs of registration to the benefits it pro-
duces. Unfortunately, in contrast to the extensive empirical work on the
costs of registration, we know very little about the benefits of registration.
We can specify the benefits of registration in general theoretical terms,
but those benefits are almost impossible to quantify in practice.
The basic purpose of the Securities Act is to increase the quantity
and quality of information available to investors. The hope is that inves-
tors can use this information to more accurately predict an issuer's future
returns and, therefore, more accurately price the offering. The benefit of
Securities Act registration comes in the form of increased expected
returns or reduced risk.
The benefit of registration will vary from offering to offering,
depending on the characteristics of the individual offering. In some
cases, registration will have very little impact on investor behavior. Either
as a result of existing information or purely by happenstance, the offering
is already accurately valued. Call such offerings "good" offerings. In other
cases, registration may provide enough negative information that the
offering will collapse completely. In that case, registration prevents huge
investor losses. Call these offerings "bad" offerings. And, of course, there
are various gradations of offerings between these extremes.
Because we cannot easily distinguish good offerings from bad offer-
ings prior to registration, we cannot require only bad offerings to regis-
ter. The benefit of registration is an average, which depends on the
probability of loss for any particular class of offering, the mix of offerings
in the total pool, and the effectiveness of registration in preventing the
losses that would occur in the absence of registration.
For example, assume that there are only two offerings, each in the
amount of $100,000. One of the two offerings is a good offering because
the expected rate of return on the $100,000 investment equals the mar-
ket rate of return for the amount of risk involved-in other words, if
investors knew everything about this offering, they would value its
expected risk and return at $100,000. The other offering is a bad offering
because investors in that offering will incur a total loss. Assume further
that registration is one hundred percent effective in protecting investors.
Registration will not change investors' attitudes toward the good offering
and, if registration is required, no one will participate in the bad offering.
The average benefit of registering these offerings is the average total loss
avoided, or $50,000.195
195 The average loss avoided is the weighted sum of the loss avoided on each t)e
of offering, or 0.5 x $0 + 0.5 x $100,000 = $50,000.
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Unfortunately, scholars disagree about whether there are any actual
benefits to registration,' 9 6 much less their magnitude. To determine the
benefits of registration, one must compare the risks and returns when the
offering is registered to the risks and returns of an identical offering to
identical offerees that is not registered. Risk and return are not easy to
measure, but the greater difficulty is finding a control group of offerings
for comparison. Comparable offerings are usually either uniformly regis-
tered or, if an exemption is available, not registered. Issuers, particularly
small business issuers, do not usually choose to register offerings that
could be exempted. Thus, it is much harder to quantify the benefits of
registration than to quantify the costs.
We can, however, be confident in at least one theoretical conclusion
about the benefits of Securities Act registration: the benefits of registra-
tion should correlate with the size of the offering. The larger the offer-
ing, the greater the potential losses, and therefore the greater the benefit
of registration. If registration benefits investors and everything else is
equal, it ought to provide a greater dollar benefit in a $20 million offer-
ing than in a $500 offering. The larger the offering, the more investors as
a group risk losing and, therefore, the greater the gains associated with
registration. In other words, the more investors have at risk, the greater
the benefit of the information registration provides.
C. The Case for an Unrestricted Small Offering Exemption
If the total cost to register an offering exceeds the total benefit, regis-
tration is economically inefficient even if it benefits investors, because it
costs more than the benefits it provides. Consider the following simple
example of an issuer who wishes to raise $500 by selling securities to the
general public. If it will cost $5,000 in attorneys' fees, printing costs, filing
fees, and so forth to register the offering, 19 7 registration is inefficient, no
matter how great the probability of a loss in the absence of registration.
Consider the most extreme case imaginable: the securities are worthless,
without the protection of registration buyers will lose their entire $500
investment, and registration will prevent the entire loss. In this case, the
government would be imposing a $5,000 cost to achieve a $500 gain, a
net loss of $4,500.
If investors in all small offerings lost all their money, as in this
extreme example, a prohibitive burden like this would be acceptable, as
196 The literature on this subject is extensive. Among those criticizing mandatory
disclosure are Manne, supra note 179; George J. Bentson, The Value of the SEC's
Accounting Disclosure Requirements, 44 Acct. Rev. 515 (1969); George J. Stigler, Public
Regulation of the Securities Markets, 37 J. Bus. 117 (1964). Among those on the other
side of the issue are Joel Seligman, The Historical Need for a Mandatory Corporate
Disclosure System, 9J. CORP. L. 1 (1983); Morton Backer, Comments on "The Value of the
SEC's Accounting Disclosure Requirements, " 44 Acct. Rev. 533 (1989); Irwin Friend &
Edward S. Herman, The S.E.C. Through a Glass Darkly, 37J. Bus. 382 (1964).
197 In reality, of course, the cost would be much greater.
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would an absolute ban. Why allow such offerings if there is no associated
gain? But not all small offerings fit this extreme example. In revising Rule
504, the SEC did not argue that all, or even most, small offerings are
fraudulent. Only a third or less of the Rule 504 offerings each year
involve securities traded on the NASD OTC Bulletin Board, the SEC's
principal concern. 198 Furthermore, the SEC conceded in the release
adopting the 1999 amendments that most of the fraud was in secondary
trading and not in the initial issue of microcap securities.1 9 9 In effect, the
SEC is penalizing innocent small business issuers for the subsequent
manipulation of some small businesses' securities by others. This is analo-
gous to shutting down General Motors or Microsoft solely because
unscrupulous individuals attempt to manipulate their stock.
There may be more fraud in small offerings, or at least proportion-
ately more,20 0 but that does not refute the basic argument: as long as
many small offerings are legitimate, there is some offering amount below
which registration, or any conditional exemption, is inefficient. Offerings
for less than that amount should be exempted.
1. Full Registration vs. Total Exemption
To prove the efficiency of an unconditional small offering exemp-
tion, we can develop a model of the costs and benefits of registration.
Assume that we must choose between requiring registration of an offer-
ing or completely exempting the offering. 20 1 We want to exempt the
offering if the total cost of registration, including the government's cost
of regulating the offering, exceeds the total benefit. We know that the
total cost of registration is the sum of a fixed cost that does not depend
on the offering amount and a variable cost that does:20
2
TOTAL COST = FC + (VC x OA),
where FC = the fixed cost of compliance,
198 Revision of Rule 504 of Regulation D, the "Seed Capital" Exemption,
Securities Act Release No. 7541, 63 Fed. Reg. 29,168, 29,169 n.l (proposed May 28,
1998). There are approximately 1500 Form D filings claiming Rule 504 each year,
with approximately 300 to 500 of those applications for OTC Bulletin Board
quotations each year based on the Rule 504 exemption. Id.
199 The SEC cited five actions involving secondary trading, and only two
involving issuers. Revision of Rule 504 of Regulation D, the "Seed Capital"
Exemption, Securities Act Release No. 7644, 64 Fed. Reg. 11090, 11091 nn.14-15
(Mar. 8, 1999). The SEC conceded that there was "a lesser degree" of fraud in the
initial Rule 504 offerings. Id. at 11091.
20 See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Small Is Not Beautiful: The Case Against Special
Regulatory Treatment of Small Firms, 50 ADMIN. L. REv. 537 (1998) (arguing that small
firms are responsible for a disproportionate amount of the problems that regulation
seeks to cure).
201 This either-or choice is unrealistic because it ignores the possibility of
regulation weaker than full registration. I deal with that possibility later.
202 The model in the text assumes a linear relationship between the offering
amount and the variable cost of registration. Assuming a non-linear relationship does
not change the basic policy conclusion.
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OA = the offering amount, and
VC = the variable cost of compliance, as a fraction of the offering
amount.
The total benefit of registration is the investor loss that registration
prevents, which is also a function of the offering amount. The larger the
dollar amount of the offering, the greater the benefit of registration.
That total benefit, in turn, depends on two things: (1) the total loss to
investors if the offering was not registered, expressed as a percentage of
the offering amount; and (2) the portion of that loss the registration pre-
vents, expressed as a percentage of the possible total loss. Thus: 20 3
TOTAL BENEFIT = TL x LA x OA,
where TL = the total loss in the absence of registration, as a frac-
tion of the offering amount,
LA = the proportion of the loss avoided by registration, as a frac-
tion of the total loss, and
OA = the offering amount.
Putting these two equations together, the offering should be
exempted if the total cost exceeds the total benefit:
FC + (VC x OA) > TL x LA x OA.
To illustrate how the model works, consider whether $1 million
offerings should be exempted. In this instance, OA is $1 million. Assume
the following hypothetical figures: The average loss on a $1 million offer-
ing, in the absence of registration, is $100,000-ten percent of the offer-
ing amount. Thus, TL is 0.1. Registration, on average, prevents half of
that loss, so LA is 0.5. The cost to register the offering includes a fixed
cost, or FC, of $40,000, plus two percent of the offering amount, for VC of
0.02. The offering should be exempted because:
FC + (VC x OA) > TL x LA x OA
$40,000 + (0.02 x $1,000,000) > 0.1 x 0.5 x $1,000,000
$40,000 + $20,000 > 0.05 x $1,000,000
$60,000 > $50,000.
Given the hypothetical cost and benefit figures, requiring registra-
tion of $1 million offerings results in a net loss, so they should be
exempted.
2. Partial Regulation vs. Exemption
The costs and benefits of regulating securities offerings are a func-
tion not just of the amount of the offering, but also of the amount of
regulation. The choice is not simply between full registration or nothing
at all. Offerings can be partially regulated without requiring the issuer to
file a registration statement and to deliver a prospectus to all offerees.
Rule 504 itself is an illustration of partial regulation. Issuers are not
203 As with costs, the model assumes a linear relationship between the offering
amount and the benefit of registration. Again, assuming a non-linear relationship
does not change the basic policy conclusion.
2001]
32 THE JOURNAL OF SMALL & EMERGING BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 5:1
required to file a registration statement or deliver a prospectus, but there
are other restrictions on the offering designed to protect investors. An
issuer cannot solicit investors, and resales are restricted.
The costs and benefits of complying with Rule 504, or any other
intermediate regulation like Rule 504, are obviously not the same as the
costs and benefits of registration. Rule 504 does not provide all of the
benefits of registration, but the cost of complying with Rule 504 is also
less. Like the registration requirement, Rule 504 involves both fixed and
variable costs. And, as with registration, the benefit of complying with
Rule 504 should be a function of the offering amount: the larger the
offering, the more there is to gain from regulation. Since the costs and
benefits of complying with Rule 504 have the same characteristics as the
costs and benefits of registration, the same model can be used to choose
between some lesser level of regulation, such as Rule 504, and a full
exemption. The model is the same, but the costs and benefits we are
using are the costs and benefits associated with Rule 504. The model can
now tell us when we should force offerings to comply with the conditions
of Rule 504 and when the exemption should be unconditional.
Assume that the choice is between an unconditional exemption from
both federal and state regulation and Rule 504 in its current form. If the
fixed cost of complying with state registration and Rule 504 is $10,000,
the variable cost is ten percent of the offering amount, the total loss in an
unregulated offering is fifty percent, and compliance with Rule 504 pre-
vents half of that loss, an offering with an aggregate offering amount of
$50,000 should be unconditionally exempted because:
FC + (VC x OA) > TL x LA x OA
$10,000 + (0.1 x $50,000) > 0.5 x 0.5 x $50,000
$15,000 > $12,500.
On the other hand, given these parameters, an offering of $100,000
should be required to comply with Rule 504 and state registration
requirements because:
FC + (VC x OA) < TL x LA x OA
$10,000 + (0.1 x $100,000) < 0.5 x 0.5 x $100,000
$20,000 < $25,000.
Using this basic formula and a little algebra to adjust the formula, we
can calculate what the amount of the unconditional exemption should be
for any specified set of parameters. 20 4 The table in Appendix B calculates
204 The break-even point is where the total cost of compliance equals the total
benefit-in other words, where
FC + (VC x OA) = TL x LA x OA.
Using a little algebra, we can revise this equation to solve for the offering amount at
the break-even point:
OA(TL x LA) = FC + OA(VC)
OA(TL x LA) - OA(VC) = FC
OA((TL x LA) - VC) = FC
OA = FC/((TL x LA) - VC).
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the appropriate amount of an unconditional exemption, given various
possible combinations of costs and benefits. Although we do not have
adequate empirical evidence to specify these costs and benefits exacdy,
the model clearly shows that an unconditional exemption is justified. To
determine the exact amount of the exemption, we should estimate the
costs and benefits of complying with a more restrictive exemption like
Rule 504. One million dollars may not have been the appropriate
amount, but the basic unconditional structure of Rule 504 prior to 1999
was correct. The SEC's elimination of the only unconditional small offer-
ing exemption was a mistake.
D. The Need for Associated State Law Changes
Returning Rule 504 to its pre-1999 form is not sufficient. Under both
the 1992 and 1999 versions of Rule 504, states remain free to regulate
offerings that Rule 504 exempts from the federal registration require-
ments. Rather than completely deregulating such offerings, Rule 504
merely defers to state regulators. 20 5 Most states essentially neutralized the
effects of the 1992 amendments to Rule 504 by refusing to provide a con-
forming state exemption. 20 6 Most states continue to require the registra-
tion of Rule 504 offerings, although often by way of the simplified small
corporate offering (SCOR) registration form. 20 7 Rule 504 offerings are
sometimes exempted from state registration requirements, but those state
exemptions often impose substantial restrictions, and variations from
state to state make interstate offerings even more difficult. 20 8
The answer to this regulatory mishmash is a single, coordinated
small offering exemption. Removing the conditions from Rule 504 and
restoring it to its pre-1999 state would be a good first step, but even this
would be relatively ineffective unless Rule 504 also preempted any non-
conforming state laws or exemptions. 20 9 The National Securities Markets
Improvement Act of 1996 preempted state registration requirements for
many offerings by large public companies, 2 10 but left the situation
The formula assumes that the variable cost of complying with Rule 504 is less than the
variable benefit of compliance. If not, the formula produces a negative number as the
offering amount at the break-even point. But if that is the case, the total benefit of
compliance will never exceed the total cost and all offerings should be exempted.
205 The Impact, supra note 6, at 518.
206 Rutheford B. Campbell, Jr., The Impact of NSMIA on Small Issuers, 53 Bus. LAW
575, 580 (1998).
207 The Impact, supra note 6, at 518.
208 Rutheford B. Campbell, Jr., Blue Sky Laws and the Recent Congressional
Preemption Failure, 22J. CORP. LAw 175, 191 (1997).
209 Carl W. Schneider, Small Business Capital Raising-The Need for Further SEC
Initiatives, INSIGHTS, Feb. 1993, at 2.
210 15 U.S.C. § 77r(a), (b) (Supp. V 1999).
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unchanged for most small business offerings. 2 1' Small businesses should
receive the same consideration that the 1996 Act gave public companies:
the states should be preempted from requiring the registration of Rule
504 offerings. 2 12
VI. CONCLUSION
The SEC's concern with microcap fraud is laudable, but the Commis-
sion should not penalize all small business issuers for the misdeeds of a
few. The answer to fraud lies in aggressive use of Rule lOb-5 and other
antifraud rules, not in a prophylactic bar that ensnares even the smallest,
least sophisticated businesses. The cost of registering the smallest offer-
ings, or even of restricting those offerings as Rule 504 does, clearly
exceeds the benefit. The model developed in this article conclusively
demonstrates that an unconditional small offering exemption isjustified.
Instead of wringing its hands about its inability to prevent all securities
fraud, the SEC must recognize that fraud prevention sometimes has too
high a cost. It should instead try to estimate the approximate costs and
benefits of regulation, determine the appropriate dollar amount of an
unconditional exemption, and adopt one.
211 Campbell, supra, note 208, at 204 (observing that securities offered in small
business offerings would not ordinarily be covered securities under 15 U.S.C.
§ 77r(b), and thus would not be covered by the preemption provisions).
22 See Div. CORP. FIN., SEC, FINAL REPORT OF THE SEC GOVERNMENT-BUSINESS
FORUM ON SMALL BUSINESS CAPITAL FORMATION (Feb. 1995), www.sec.gov/smbus/
finrepl3.txt (calling for the complete preemption of state registration of securities
offerings).
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APPENDIX A-THE COST OF REGISTERED
SECURITIES OFFERINGS213
Table 1: Costs of Flotation as a Percent of Proceeds for Publicly
Offered and Privately Placed Debt Issues, 1951, 1953, and 1955214
Size of Issue (Million $)
0.5-0.9 1.0-1.9 2.0-4.9 5.0-9.9 10.0-19.9 20.0+
Total Cost
Publicly offered 10.24 8.00 3.33 1.53 1.44 1.22
Privately placed 2.14 1.52 1.12 0.83 0.63 0.44
Difference 8.10 6.48 2.21 0.70 0.81 0.78
Compensation
Publicly offered 6.50 5.50 2.25 0.70 0.68 0.73
Privately placed 1.31 0.97 0.69 0.49 0.31 0.22
Difference 5.19 4.03 2.56 0.30 0.37 0.51
Other Expenses
Publicly offered 3.14 2.20 1.24 0.85 0.61 0.42
Privately placed 0.83 0.59 0.43 0.34 0.32 0.22
Difference 2.31 1.61 0.81 0.51 0.29 0.20
Table 2: Costs of Flotation as a Percentage of Proceeds for
Underwritten, Registered Common Stock Issues, 1971 to 1975215
Size of issue Compensation Other expenses Total cost
(million $) Number (% of proceeds) (% of proceeds) (% of proceeds)
Under 0.50 0 - --
0.50-0.99 6 6.96 6.78 13.74
1.00-1.99 18 10.40 4.89 15.29
2.00-4.99 61 6.59 2.87 9.47
5.00-9.99 66 5.50 1.53 7.03
10.00-19.99 91 4.84 0.71 5.55
20.00-49.99 156 4.30 0.37 4.67
50.00-99.99 70 3.97 0.21 4.18
100.00-500.00 16 3.81 0.14 3.95
Total/Average 484 5.02 1.15 6.17
213 The tables in this Appendix come from different sources using different data
and different definitions of costs. Therefore, the results in the various tables are not
directly comparable.
214 Bentson, supra note 176, at 62. The mathematical errors in this table appear
in the original.
215 Smith, supra note 180, at 277.
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Table 3: Direct Expenses of Going Public as a Percentage of Gross
Proceeds, 1977 to 1982216
Number of Underwriting Other Total cash
Gross Proceeds offers discount (%) expenses (%) expenses (%)
Firm commitment offers
100,000-1,999,999 68 9.84 9.64 19.48
2,000,000-3,999,999 165 9.83 7.60 17.43
4,000,000-5,999,999 133 9.10 5.67 14.77
6,000,000-9,999,999 122 8.03 4.31 12.34
10,000,000-120,174,195 176 7.24 2.10 9.34
All offers 664 8.67 5.36 14.03
Best efforts offers
100,000-1,999,999 175 10.63 9.52 20.15
2,000,000-3,999,999 146 10.00 6.21 16.21
4,000,000-5,999,999 23 9.86 3.71 13.57
6,000,000-9,999,999 15 9.80 3.42 13.22
10,000,000-120,174,195 5 8.03 2.40 10.43
All offers 364 10.26 7.48 17.74
Table 4: Direct and Indirect Costs, in Percent, of Equity IPOs,
1990 to 1994217
Average Direct
Proceeds Gross Other Total Direct Average Initial and Indirect
($ millions) Spreads Expenses Costs Returns Costs
2-9.99 9.05% 7.91% 16.96% 16.36% 25.16%
10-19.99 7.24% 4.39% 11.63% 9.65% 18.15%
20-39.99 7.01% 2.69% 9.70% 12.48% 18.18%
40-59.99 6.96% 1.76% 8.72% 13.65% 17.95%
60-79.99 6.74% 1.46% 8.20% 11.31% 16.35%
80-99.99 6.47% 1.44% 7.91% 8.91% 14.14%
100-199.99 6.03% 1.03% 7.06% 7.16% 12.78%
200-499.99 5.67% 0.86% 6.53% 5.70% 11.10%
500-up 5.21% 0.51% 5.72% 7.53% 10.36%
All offers 7.31% 3.69% 11.00% 12.05% 18.69%
216 Ritter, supra note 182, at 272.
217 Lee et al., supra note 184, at 67, tbl. 4.
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Table 5: Average Gross Spreads and Total Direct Costs, in Percent, for
Domestic Debt Issues, 1990 to 1994211
Proceeds
($ millions) Convertible Bonds Straight Bonds
Investment Noninvestment Investment Noninvestment
Grade Grade Grade Grade
N GS TDC N GS TDC N GS TDC N GS TDC
2-9.99 0 - - 0 - - 14 0.58 2.19 0 - -
10-19.99 0 - - 1 4.00 5.67 56 0.50 1.19 2 5.13 7.41
20-39.99 1 1.75 2.75 9 3.29 4.92 64 0.86 1.48 9 3.11 4.42
40-59.99 3 1.92 2.43 19 3.37 4.58 78 0.47 0.94 9 2.48 3.35
60-79.99 4 1.31 1.76 41 2.76 3.37 49 0.61 0.98 43 3.07 3.84
80-99.99 2 1.07 1.34 10 2.83 3.48 65 0.66 0.94 47 2.78 3.75
100-199.99 20 2.03 2.33 37 2.51 3.00 181 0.57 0.81 222 2.75 3.44
200-499.99 17 1.71 1.87 10 2.46 2.70 60 0.50 0.93 105 2.56 2.96
500-up 3 2.00 2.09 0 - - 11 0.39 0.57 9 2.60 2.90
All offers 50 1.81 2.09 127 2.81 3.53 578 0.58 0.94 446 2.75 3.42
Table 6: Direct Costs as a Percentage of Gross Proceeds for Equity
IPOs and SEOs for Domestic Operating Companies, 1990 to 1994219
Proceeds
($ millions) Initial Public Offerings (IPOs) Seasoned Equity Offerings (SEOs)
N GS E TDC N GS E TDC
2-9.99 337 9.05 7.91 16.96 167 7.72 5.56 13.28
10-19.99 389 7.24 4.39 11.63 310 6.23 2.49 8.72
20-39.99 533 7.01 2.69 9.70 425 5.60 1.33 6.93
40-59.99 215 6.96 1.76 8.72 261 5.05 0.82 5.87
60-79.99 79 6.74 1.46 8.20 143 4.57 0.61 5.18
80-99.99 51 6.47 1.44 7.91 71 4.25 0.48 4.73
100-199.99 106 6.03 1.03 7.06 152 3.85 0.37 4.22
200-499.99 47 5.67 0.86 6.53 55 3.26 0.21 3.47
500-up 10 5.21 0.51 5.72 9 3.03 0.12 3.15
All offers 1767 7.31 3.69 11.00 1593 5.44 1.67 7.11
218 Id. at 66, tbl. 3.
219 Id. at 62, tbl. 1.
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Table 7: The Costs of Going Public Analyzed by Offering Size for 723
Initial Public Offerings over the Period 1983 to 1987, Categorized by
Whether or Not Underwriters Were Granted Warrants 220
Average Average Average Average Average
Number of warrant warrant initial underwriter other Average
Gross proceeds offerings cost value returns discount expense total cost
Offers without underwriter warrants
100,000-
1,999,999 3 - - -1.15% 10.00% 14.13% 23.21%
2,000,000-
3,999,999 9 - - 5.82% 8.39% 8.42% 20.40%
4,000,000-
5,999,999 45 - - 6.49% 8.35% 6.27% 18.80%
6,000,000-
9,999,999 84 - - 5.87% 7.62% 4.40% 15.76%
10,000,000
and above 456 - - 6.48% 6.96% 2.21% 13.66%
All offers 597 - - 6.35% 7.17% 2.98% 14.49%
Offers with underwriter warrants
100,000-
1,999,999 4 0.00% 4.43% 37.86% 9.62% 9.93% 39.06%
2,000,000-
3,999,999 37 0.00% 4.49% 9.27% 9.64% 8.27% 27.41%
4,000,000-
5,999,999 29 0.00% 4.16% 3.64% 8.67% 7.05% 22.15%
6,000,000-
9,999,999 35 0.06% 3.58% 16.64% 8.27% 5.31% 26.47%
10,000,000
and above 21 0.00% 2.98% 17.55% 7.75% 2.81% 22.81%
All offers 126 0.02% 3.92% 12.31% 8.73% 6.31% 25.54%
220 Barry et al., supra note 188, at 128-29, tbl. 5. Warrant value calculated using
Black-Scholes method.
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APPENDIX B-CALCULATED AMOUNT OF AN
UNCONDITIONAL EXEMPTION
Hypothetical Costs and Benefits
% of Losses, % of Losses Amount of
Fixed Cost Marginal Cost No Compliance Avoided Exemption
2,500 0.025 0.5 0.5 $11,111
2,500 0.025 0.5 0.25 $25,000
2,500 0.025 0.5 0.125 $66,667
2,500 0.025 0.5 0.0675 $285,714
2,500 0.025 0.25 0.5 $25,000
2,500 0.025 0.25 0.25 $66,667
2,500 0.025 0.25 0.125 $400,000
2,500 0.025 0.25 0.0675 CompleteExemption
Complete
2,500 0.025 0.0125 0.5 Exemption
Complete
2,500 0.025 0.0125 0.25 Exemption
Exemplto
2,500 0.025 0.0125 0.125 CompleteExemption
Complete
2,500 0.025 0.0125 0.0675 Exemption
2,500 0.05 0.5 0.5 $12,500
2,500 0.05 0.5 0.25 $33,333
2,500 0.05 0.5 0.125 $200,000
2,500 0.05 0.5 0.0675 Complete
Exemption
2,500 0.05 0.25 0.5 $33,333
2,500 0.05 0.25 0.25 $200,000
0.25 0.125 Complete
2,500 0.05 0Exemption
0.0675 Complete
2,500 0.05 0.25 Exemption
Complete
2,500 0.05 0.0125 0.5 Exemption
Complete
2,500 0.05 0.0125 0.25 Exemption
2,500 0.05 0.0125 0.125 CompleteExemption
2,500 0.05 0.0125 0.0675 Complete
Exemption
2,500 0.1 0.5 0.5 $16,667
2,500 0.1 0.5 0.25 $100,000
2,500 0.1 0.5 0.125 CompleteExemption
2,500 0.1 0.5 0.0675 Complete
_________ ____________ _______ _________ I Exemption_
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% of Losses, % of Losses Amount of
Fixed Cost Marginal Cost No Compliance Avoided Exemption
2,500 0.1 0.25 0.5 $100,000
2,500 0.1 0.25 0.25 Complete
Exemption
2,500 0.1 0.25 0.125 Complete
Exemption
2,500 0.1 0.25 0.0675 Complete
Exemption
2,500 0.1 0.0125 0.5 Complete
Exemption
2,500 0.1 0.0125 0.25 Complete
Exemption
2,500 0.1 0.0125 0.125 Complete
Exemption
2,500 0.1 0.0125 0.0675 Complete
Exemption
5,000 0.025 0.5 0.5 $22,222
5,000 0.025 0.5 0.25 $50,000
5,000 0.025 0.5 0.125 $133,333
5,000 0.025 0.5 . 0.0675 $571,429
5,000 0.025 0.25 0.5 $50,000
5,000 0.025 0.25 0.25 $133,333
5,000 0.025 0.25 0.125 $800,000
5,000 0.025 0.25 0.0675 Complete
Exemption
5,000 0.025 0.0125 0.5 Complete
Exemption
5,000 0.025 0.0125 0.25 Complete
Exemption
5,000 0.025 0.0125 0.125 Complete
Exemption
5,000 0.025 0.0125 0.0675 Complete
Exemption
5,000 0.05 0.5 0.5 $25,000
5,000 0.05 0.5 0.25 $66,667
5,000 0.05 0.5 0.125 $400,000
5,000 0.05 0.5 0.0675 Complete
Exemption
5,000 0.05 0.25 0.5 $66,667
5,000 0.05 0.25 0.25 $400,000
5,000 0.05 0.25 0.125 Complete
Exemption
5,000 0.05 0.25 0.0675 Complete
Exemption
5,000 0.05 0.0125 0.5 Complete
Exemption
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% of Losses, % of Losses Amount of
Fixed Cost Marginal Cost No Compliance Avoided Exemption
5,000 0.05 0.0125 0.25 CompleteExemption
5,000 0.05 0.0125 0.125 Complete
Exemption
5,000 0.05 0.0125 0.0675 Complete
Exemption
5,000 0.1 0.5 0.5 $33,333
5,000 0.1 0.5 0.25 $200,000
5,000 0.1 0.5 0.125 Complete
Exemption
5,000 0.1 0.5 0.0675 Complete
Exemption
5,000 0.1 0.25 0.5 $200,000
5,000 0.1 0.25 0.25 Complete
Exemption
5,000 0.1 0.25 0.125 Complete
Exemption
5,000 0.1 0.25 0.0675 Complete
Exemption
5,000 0.1 0.0125 0.5 CompleteExemption
5,000 0.1 0.0125 0.25 Complete
Exemption
5,000 0.1 0.0125 0.125 Complete
Exemption
5,000 0.1 0.0125 0.0675 Complete
Exemption
10,000 0.025 0.5 0.5 $44,444
10,000 0.025 0.5 0.25 $100,000
10,000 0.025 0.5 0.125 $266,667
10,000 0.025 0.5 0.0675 $1,142,857
10,000 0.025 0.25 0.5 $100,000
10,000 0.025 0.25 0.25 $266,667
10,000 0.025 0.25 0.125 $1,600,000
10,000 0.025 0.25 0.0675 Complete
Exemption
10,000 0.025 0.0125 0.5 Complete
Exemption
10,000 0.025 0.0125 0.25 Complete
Exemption
10,000 0.025 0.0125 0.125 Complete
Exemption
10,000 0.025 0.0125 0.0675 Complete
Exemption
10,000 0.05 0.5 0.5 $50,000
10,000 0.05 0.5 0.25 $133,333
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% of Losses, % of Losses Amount of
Fixed Cost Marginal Cost No Compliance Avoided Exemption
10,000 0.05 0.5 0.125 $800,000
10,000 0.05 0.5 0.0675 CompleteExemption
10,000 0.05 0.25 0.5 $133,333
10,000 0.05 0.25 0.25 $800,000
10,000 0.05 0.25 0.125 CompleteExemption
10,000 0.05 0.25 0.0675 CompleteExemption
10,000 0.05 0.0125 0.5 CompleteExemption
10,000 0.05 0.0125 0.25 CompleteExemption
10,000 0.05 0.0125 0.125 CompleteExemption
10,000 0.05 0.0125 0.0675 Complete
Exemption
10,000 0.1 0.5 0.5 $66,667
10,000 0.1 0.5 0.25 $400,000
10,000 0.1 0.5 0.125 CompleteExemption
10,000 0.1 0.5 0.0675 CompleteExemption
10,000 0.1 0.25 0.5 $400,000
10,000 0.1 0.25 0.25 CompleteExemption
10,000 0.1 0.25 0.125 CompleteExemption
10,000 0.1 0.25 0.0675 CompleteExemption
10,000 0.1 0.0125 0.5 CompleteExemption
10,000 0.1 0.0125 0.25 CompleteExemption
10,000 0.1 0.0125 0.125 CompleteExemption
10,000 0.1 0.0125 0.0675 CompleteExemption
15,000 0.025 0.5 0.5 $66,667
15,000 0.025 0.5 0.25 $150,000
15,000 0.025 0.5 0.125 $400,000
15,000 0.025 0.5 0.0675 $1,714,286
15,000 0.025 0.25 0.5 $150,000
15,000 0.025 0.25 0.25 $400,000
15,000 0.025 0.25 0.125 $2,400,000
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% of Losses, % of Losses Amount of
Fixed Cost Marginal Cost No Compliance Avoided Exemption
15,000 0.025 0.25 0.0675 Complete
Exemption
15,000 0.025 0.0125 0.5 Complete
Exemption
0.025 0.0125 0.25 Complete
15,000 0Exemption
15,000 0.025 0.0125 0.125 CompleteExemption
15,000 0.025 0.0125 0.0675 Complete
Exemption
15,000 0.05 0.5 0.5 $75,000
15,000 0.05 0.5 0.25 $200,000
15,000 0.05 0.5 0.125 $1,200,000
15,000 0.05 0.5 0.0675 Complete
Exemption
15,000 0.05 0.25 0.5 $200,000
15,000 0.05 0.25 0.25 $1,200,000
15,000 0.05 0.25 0.125 CompleteExemption
15,000 0.05 0.25 0.0675 CompleteExemption
15,000 0.05 0.0125 0.5 CompleteExemption
15,000 0.05 0.0125 0.25 Complete
Exemption
15,000 0.05 0.0125 0.125 CompleteExemption
15,000 0.05 0.0125 0.0675 Complete
Exemption
15,000 0.1 0.5 0.5 $100,000
15,000 0.1 0.5 0.25 $600,000
15,000 0.1 0.5 0.125 Complete
Exemption
15,000 0.1 0.5 0.0675 Complete
Exemption
15,000 0.1 0.25 0.5 $600,000
15,000 0.1 0.25 0.25 Complete
Exemption
15,000 0.1 0.25 0.125 CompleteExemption
15,000 0.1 0.25 0.0675 Complete
Exemption
15,000 0.1 0.0125 0.5 Complete
Exemption
15,000 0.1 0.0125 0.25 CompleteExemption
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% of Losses, % of Losses Amount of
Fixed Cost Marginal Cost No Compliance Avoided Exemption
15,000 0.1 0.0125 0.125 CompleteExemption
15,000 0.1 0.0125 0.0675 Complete
Exemption
20,000 0.025 0.5 0.5 $88,889
20,000 0.025 0.5 0.25 $200,000
20,000 0.025 0.5 0.125 $533,333
20,000 0.025 0.5 0.0675 $2,285,714
20,000 0.025 0.25 0.5 $200,000
20,000 0.025 0.25 0.25 $533,333
20,000 0.025 0.25 0.125 $3,200,000
20,000 0.025 0.25 0.0675 CompleteExemption
20,000 0.025 0.0125 0.5 CompleteExemption
20,000 0.025 0.0125 0.25 CompleteExemption
20,000 0.025 0.0125 0.125 Complete
Exemption
20,000 0.025 0.0125 0.0675 Complete
Exemption
20,000 0.05 0.5 0.5 $100,000
20,000 0.05 0.5 0.25 $266,667
20,000 0.05 0.5 0.125 $1,600,000
20,000 0.05 0.5 0.0675 Complete
Exemption
20,000 0.05 0.25 0.5 $266,667
20,000 0.05 0.25 0.25 $1,600,000
20,000 0.05 0.25 0.125 CompleteExemption
20,000 0.05 0.25 0.0675 CompleteExemption
20,000 0.05 0.0125 0.5 CompleteExemption
20,000 0.05 0.0125 0.25 CompleteExemption
20,000 0.05 0.0125 0.125 Complete
Exemption
20,000 0.05 0.0125 0.0675 Complete
Exemption
20,000 0.1 0.5 0.5 $133,333
20,000 0.1 0.5 0.25 $800,000
20,000 0.1 0.5 0.125 CompleteExemption
20,000 0.1 0.5 0.0675 CompleteExemption
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% of Losses, % of Losses Amount of
Fixed Cost Marginal Cost No Compliance Avoided Exemption
20,000 0.1 0.25 0.5 $800,000
20,000 0.1 0.25 0.25 CompleteExemption
20,000 0.1 0.25 0.125 CompleteExemption
20,000 0.1 0.25 0.0675 CompleteExemption
20,000 0.1 0.0125 0.5 CompleteExemption
20,000 0.1 0.0125 0.25 CompleteExemption
20,000 0.1 0.0125 0.125 CompleteExemption
20,000 0.1 0.0125 0.0675 CompleteExemption
25,000 0.025 0.5 0.5 $111,111
25,000 0.025 0.5 0.25 $250,000
25,000 0.025 0.5 0.125 $666,667
25,000 0.025 0.5 0.0675 $2,857,143
25,000 0.025 0.25 0.5 $250,000
25,000 0.025 0.25 0.25 $666,667
25,000 0.025 0.25 0.125 $4,000,000
25,000 0.025 0.25 0.0675 CompleteExemption
25,000 0.025 0.0125 0.5 CompleteExemption
25,000 0.025 0.0125 0.25 Complete
Exemption
25,000 0.025 0.0125 0.125 CompleteExemption
25,000 0.025 0.0125 0.0675 Complete
Exemption
25,000 0.05 0.5 0.5 $125,000
25,000 0.05 0.5 0.25 $333,333
25,000 0.05 0.5 0.125 $2,000,000
25,000 0.05 0.5 0.0675 Complete
Exemption
25,000 0.05 0.25 0.5 $333,333
25,000 0.05 0.25 0.25 $2,000,000
25,000 0.05 0.25 0.125 CompleteExemption
25,000 0.05 0.25 0.0675 CompleteExemption
25,000 0.05 0.0125 0.5 CompleteExemption
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% of Losses, % of Losses Amount of
Fixed Cost Marginal Cost No Compliance Avoided Exemption
25,000 0.05 0.0125 0.25 Complete
Exemption
25,000 0.05 0.0125 0.125 Complete
Exemption
25,000 0.05 0.0125 0.0675 Complete
Exemption
25,000 0.1 0.5 0.5 $166,667
25,000 0.1 0.5 0.25 $1,000,000
25,000 0.1 0.5 0.125 Complete
Exemption
25,000 0.1 0.5 0.0675 Complete
Exemption
25,000 0.1 0.25 0.5 $1,000,000
25,000 0.1 0.25 0.25 CompleteExemption
25,000 0.1 0.25 0.125 Complete
Exemption
25,000 0.1 0.25 0.0675 Complete
Exemption
25,000 0.1 0.0125 0.5 Complete
Exemption
25,000 0.1 0.0125 0.25 CompleteExemption
25,000 0.1 0.0125 0.125 CompleteExemption
25,000 0.1 0.0125 0.0675 Complete
Exemption
50,000 0.025 0.5 0.5 $222,222
50,000 0.025 0.5 0.25 $500,000
50,000 0.025 0.5 0.125 $1,333,333
50,000 0.025 0.5 0.0675 $5,714,286
50,000 0.025 0.25 0.5 $500,000
50,000 0.025 0.25 0.25 $1,333,333
50,000 0.025 0.25 0.125 $8,000,000
50,000 0.025 0.25 0.0675 CompleteExemption
50,000 0.025 0.0125 0.5 Complete
Exemption
50,000 0.025 0.0125 0.25 CompleteExemption
50,000 0.025 0.0125 0.125 Complete
Exemption
50,000 0.025 0.0125 0.0675 Complete
Exemption
50,000 0.05 0.5 0.5 $250,000
50,000 0.05 0.5 0.25 $666,667
SECURITIES REGULATION AND SMALL BUSINESS
% of Losses, % of Losses Amount of
Fixed Cost Marginal Cost No Compliance Avoided Exemption
50,000 0.05 0.5 0.125 $4,000,000
50,000 0.05 0.5 0.0675 Complete
Exemption
50,000 0.05 0.25 0.5 $666,667
50,000 0.05 0.25 0.25 $4,000,000
50,000 0.05 0.25 0.125 CompleteExemption
50,000 0.05 0.25 0.0675 CompleteExemption
50,000 0.05 0.0125 0.5 Complete
Exemption
50,000 0.05 0.0125 0.25 CompleteExemption
50,000 0.05 0.0125 0.125 Complete
Exemption
50,000 0.05 0.0125 0.0675 Complete
Exemption
50,000 0.1 0.5 0.5 $333,333
50,000 0.1 0.5 0.25 $2,000,000
50,000 0.1 0.5 0.125 CompleteExemption
50,000 0.1 0.5 0.0675 CompleteExemption
50,000 0.1 0.25 0.5 $2,000,000
50,000 0.1 0.25 0.25 CompleteExemption
50,000 0.1 0.25 0.125 CompleteExemption
50,000 0.1 0.25 0.0675 CompleteExemption
50,000 0.1 0.0125 0.5 Complete
Exemption
50,000 0.1 0.0125 0.25 Complete
Exemption
50,000 0.1 0.0125 0.125 Complete
Exemption
50,000 0.1 0.0125 0.0675 Complete
Exemption
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